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Frymark: Trademark Dilution: A Proposal to Stop the Infection from Spreadi

TRADEMARK DILUTION: A PROPOSAL TO
STOP THE INFECTION FROM SPREADING
This is the essence of dilution.... [It] is an infection, which if
allowed to spread, will inevitably destroy the advertising value
of the mark.'
I. INTRODUCTION

Tom is the owner of a prosperous and famous fast food chain, Tom's
Delicious Tacos.2 Tom's business has been around for thirty years, and
there are several franchise restaurants in every state and numerous
Tom's Delicious Tacos has a distinctive
international locations.
trademark, which is a big letter "T" with a taco sitting on top of the "T."
This trademark has been registered with the Patent and Trademark
Office for thirty years, and Tom regularly polices his mark by looking for
others who are trying to unfairly infringe or dilute his mark. The
consuming public easily recognizes Tom's trademark, and they
automatically associate the "T" and taco with Tom's Delicious Tacos
restaurant.
Anna is the owner of a huge chain of hardware stores, which are
located in every state. Recently, the hardware business has been a little
slow, and Anna has decided to go into the restaurant business, namely
fast food. Anna has plans to open up two hundred restaurants
nationwide. Although she will offer a variety of fast food, such as
hamburgers, her main item and marketing staple will be tacos. Anna
plans on calling her fast food restaurants "Tim's Delightful Tacos,"
named after her brother. Anna wishes to register a big letter "T" with a
hamburger and taco placed on top of the "T" as her trademark. Anna is
well aware of "Tom's Delicious Tacos." Can Tom win on a claim of
trademark dilution?
If Tom v. Anna was filed in a district court for the Fourth or Fifth
Circuits, Tom would be required to present evidence of actual dilution
by Anna's fast food chain. 3 Proving actual dilution would be difficult for

I

H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029,1030.
This hypothetical is completely fictional and it is not intended to reflect any particular
individual, corporation, or case.
3
See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel
Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 464 (4th Cir. 1999) (stating that actual dilution can be shown by survey
evidence); see also infra note 168.
2

165
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2003

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 38, No. 1 [2003], Art. 5

166

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol.38

Tom because he most likely had not actually been harmed since Anna
had not yet opened her restaurants. Previously, the Fourth and Fifth
Circuits required that actual harm must occur to prevail on a dilution
4
claim.
However, until recently, if Tom had filed in a district court within
the Second, Sixth, or Seventh Circuits, he would have only needed to
prove a likelihood of dilution.5 This test would have been a lot easier for
Tom to establish because his fast food chain is famous, and the name
"Tom's Delicious Tacos" is unique as his distinctive trademark. Tom
would have claimed that because his and Anna's marks are so
substantially similar, his famous trademark would be diluted. In these
circuits, Tom would have likely won on his dilution claim.
However, the United States Supreme Court has recently stated that,
to win on a dilution claim, actual proof of dilution is required. 6 By
requiring proof of actual dilution, the Court has assailed the
fundamental nature of dilution. 7 Trademark scholars have noted that
"One was supposed to be able to take quick action to protect a famous
mark from erosion, but now must wait for erosion to occur before
acting." 8 Furthermore, "[tlhe practicing bar is left wondering if dilution
really even exists anymore." 9
These two conflicting approaches represent the underlying problems
inherent in the recent circuit split.10 These opposing views regarding the
correct standard to prove dilution have caused consternation among

See infra notes 160-70 and accompanying text for a detailed explanation of the Fourth
See infra notes 181-87 and accompanying text for a detailed
Circuit's reasoning.
explanation of the Fifth Circuit's reasoning.
5
See infra notes 171-80 and accompanying text for a detailed explanation of the Second
See infra notes 188-95 and accompanying text for a detailed
Circuit's reasoning.
explanation of the Seventh Circuit's reasoning. See infra notes 196-202 and accompanying
text for a detailed explanation of the Sixth Circuit's reasoning.
6
Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 427 (2003).
7
Interview with Curtis Cichowski, Associate Dean and Lecturer in Law, Valparaiso
University School of Law (Apr. 28, 2003).
8
Id.
9
Id. Injunctive relief is the only remedial option in the normal case, and it is a remedy
that is too little and too late. Id.
BEVERLY W. PATTISHALL ET AL., TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 378 (5th ed.
10
2002). A former split in the circuits developed regarding whether relief under the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act ("FTDA") required "proof of actual, consummated harm to the
trademark's selling power." Id. The Fourth Circuit concluded that the FTDA does require
proof of actual harm, and the Second Circuit has rejected this conclusion. Id.
4
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numerous courts, along with senior and junior users.1 A substantial
amount of this confusion can be attributed to the vague language in the
12
Federal Trademark Dilution Act ("FTDA").
Fundamentally, dilution is the gradual whittling away of a
trademark's distinctiveness.1 3 The junior user, or second user of the
trademark, lessens the value of the senior trademark, which
subsequently constitutes an injustice and wrong against the senior user's
good reputation and property. 14 Therefore, the dilution theory protects
the senior user's hard work from suffering unnecessary harm at the
hands of a junior user. 15 Recently among the circuits, a controversy
existed about whether a party claiming dilution must show actual
16
dilution or merely a likelihood of dilution.
This Note will contend that correctly amending the ambiguous
language of the FTDA would clear up any vagueness. 17 Part II of this
Note provides an overview of trademarks and trademark dilution
history and also chronicles state and federal dilution laws.18 Part II of
this Note also details the recent circuit split and explains each specific
circuit's rationale for applying either the actual dilution or likelihood of
dilution standard. 19 Part III analyzes each of these approaches and their
2
inherent weaknesses. 20 Part IV proposes an amendment to the FTDA. '
This amendment would alleviate a significant amount of confusion over
the ambiguous nature of the FTDA and would lead to the correct
standard being applied in the courts.

11

Id.

Id. The dispute arose primarily from the fact that the FTDA provides that liability can
be imposed where the act in question is an act, which may "cause dilution." Id.
13
See infra notes 68-75 and accompanying text for a discussion of trademark dilution
12

characteristics.
See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
14
15 PA'TISHALL, supra note 10, at 379.
16
See generally Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999); Ringling
Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449 (4th
Cir. 1999); PATrISHALL, supra note 10, at 378-79.
17
See infra Part IV. Currently, a great deal of ambiguity exists in the interpretation of the
FTDA. PATMSHALL, supra note 10, at 378. The dispute arises principally because of the
federal statute's provision that liability is caused by acts, which "cause dilution," whereas
the state statutes generally provide only for such liability where the acts are "likely to cause
dilution." Id.
18
See infra Part II.
19
See infra Part II.
20
See infra Part III.
21
See infra Part IV.
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LEGAL BACKGROUND OF TRADEMARK DILUTION

Trademark dilution exists when the consuming public inadvertently
makes a mental connection between two similar or identical trademarks
and the two parties using the trademarks. 22 Dilution only occurs in
circumstances when the public sees the junior user's application of the
mark, and customers know that there is no association between the
senior and junior users' products or services. 23 The recent cause of the
conflict in the circuit courts is related to the standard of proof that is
necessary to prove dilution. 24
Part A lays out a general overview of the trademark including its
characteristics, its role in a capitalistic society, and the public interest in
trademark protection. 25 Part B.1 then traces the history of trademark
dilution, defines trademark dilution, and explores its origins and the
conflicting methods for proving it. 26 Part B.2 outlines the history of state
dilution doctrines. Next, Part B.3 explores the FTDA and examines its
Part B.4
history, fame requirement, and dilution requirement. 27
addresses and compares the state and federal history of trademark law. 28
Finally, Part B.5 details the survey method for proving dilution.
A.

The History and Importanceof the Trademark

Trademarks are the words, symbols, phrases, or designs with which
the public can associate a single manufacturer or seller with its goods
and services. 29 The main purpose of a trademark is to guarantee the
J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24:70
(4th ed. 1996).
22

23

Id.

See infra notes 153-205 and accompanying text for a discussion on the recent split in
the circuit courts and the factors required to prove dilution.
25
See infra Part II.A.
26
See infra Part 1I.B.1.
27
See infra Part II.B.3.
28
See infra Part I.B.4. See infra Part III for an explanation of the two conflicting tests to
prove trademark dilution-likelihood of dilution and actual harm.
29
LYNN S. FRUCHTER ET AL., UNDERSTANDING BASIC TRADEMARK LAW 9-10 (2001). The
ability of a mark to perform its trademark function is measured on a sliding scale, which
goes from the weakest to the strongest trademarks: (1) generic, (2) descriptive, (3)
suggestive, and (4) arbitrary or fanciful. Courtland L. Reichman, State and Federal
Trademark Dilution, 17 FRANCHISE L.J. 111, 111 (1998). This is a spectrum dominated by
distinctiveness. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE
DOCTRINES 238 (4th ed. 1999). Generic or general terms are used as the names or
descriptions of the goods or services to which the trademark is applied. Id. These generic
terms are not trademarkable under any circumstances because they are not distinctive. Id.
24
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genuineness of a product. 30 The trademark, in simple terms, acts as a
31
substitute for the individual or manufacturer's signature and approval.
However, a trademark does not always obviously reveal the source of
the product.32
If the potential consumer recognizes the specific
trademark of a particular manufacturer in relation to its goods, then the
trademark has functioned appropriately. 33 For a trademark to be
effective, it must identify the source of the goods and be fastened to the
goods. 34

"A 'generic' term is one that is the name for the goods on which it is being used."
FRUCHTER, supra, at 159. Some examples of generic terms are "vino" for wine, "spectacles"
for eyeglasses, and "gin" for spirits. Id. Therefore, a generic term is not descriptive. Id.
On the other hand, descriptive terms "describe the characteristic or ingredient of an article
or service." GOLDSTEIN, supra, at 238. The only way these terms can become trademarks is
if they acquire a secondary meaning (the ability to identify goods with a single source),
such as "100% pure" as applied to soap. Id. The suggestive term proposes an ingredient or
characteristic of goods or services but requires the consumer to use some aspect of
imagination when establishing the nature of the goods. Id. "Ivory" in regard to soap is an
example. Id. Arbitrary or fanciful terms are so far removed from the goods and what they
represent that they receive the same protection as a suggestive mark but, in addition, are
unable to be accused of being merely descriptive. Id. "Camay Soap" is an example of an
arbitrary or fanciful trademark. Id.
30
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1500 (7th ed. 1999). Trademark is defined as a "word,
phrase, logo or other graphic symbol used by a manufacturer or seller to distinguish its
product or products from those of others." Id. A trademark may be "any sign, or any
combination of signs, capable of distinguishing the goods or services of one undertaking
from those of other undertakings." FRUCHTER, supra note 29, at 158. "The term 'sign' can
include personal names, letters, numerals, figurative elements, and combinations of colors,
as well as any combination of these signs." Id. The most common types of trademarks are
words and designs. Id.
31
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 30, at 1500.
32
Sheldon H. Klein, Introduction to Trademarks,713 PRAC. L. INST. 121,125 (2002).
33 Id.
34 Id. at 126. Exceptions do exist where the labeling of the trademark is impractical
because the goods, in such instances, are sold in large bulk shipments or are difficult to
label, such as oil shipped in tanker trucks. Id. The trademark must be affixed on any
accompanying paperwork or documentation. Id. Sometimes, a design capable of
identification is an inherent part of the trade dress of the goods. ARTHUR R. MILLER &
MICHAEL H. DAVIS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHT 241
(2d ed. 1990). Trade dress is "[a] device, including a name or design, that simply
accompanies the goods and is merely a necessary part of their packaging or is otherwise a
necessary but collateral component of the sales process and that does not primarily serve to
distinguish and identify the goods, is ineligible for registration." Id. Trade dress has also
been defined as the overall shape, look, and feel or get up of the goods that can serve a
source identifying function. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 765 n.1
(1992). However, trade dress can serve as a trademark if it actually identifies and
distinguishes the goods or service with which it is associated. MILLER & DAVIS, supra, at
241. In the Taco Cabana case, the district court instructed the jury: "'[Tirade dress' is the
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Trademarks have several characteristics. 35 For instance, trademarks
symbolize the goodwill and reputation that a company has established
over its lifetime. 36 As a reward for a company's goodwill, the trademark
acts as an advertisement and also aids consumers in making decisions
37
because they associate the trademark with the company's past quality.
The most important characteristic of a trademark is that it represents an
exclusive right, held only by the owner of the trademark; therefore, it
prevents competitors from using the mark.38 Use of the trademark
without the owner's permission is an infringement on the owner's right
39
and is legally actionable.
There are many benefits to registering and owning a trademark. 4° A
registered trademark is a valuable asset to a company. 41 It can provide
identification as well as a marketing advantage, and registration also

total image of the business." Taco Cabana, 505 U.S. at 764 n.1 (alteration in original). The
court held that Taco Cabana, a fast food chain, was able to include the following in its trade
dress: the shape and general appearance of the exterior of the restaurant, the identifying
sign, the interior kitchen floor plan, the dcor, the menu, the equipment used to serve food,
the server's uniforms, and other features reflecting on the total image of the restaurant. Id.
The Supreme Court has heard two trade dress cases in the last two terms. FRUCHTER, supra
note 29, at 159. The first case held that product configurations are not protectable under the
Lanham Act without proof of "secondary meaning" (acquired distinctiveness). Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 216 (2000). Secondary meaning can occur
when the primary significance of the product to consumers is to identify the source rather
than the specific product. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 n.l
(1982). The second case held that product features that were covered by the claims of an
expired utility patent were de jure functional and, thus, not protectable as trade dress.
TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 30-31 (2001). The Court stated that
the utility patent presented strong evidence that the configuration was functional, but it
did not adopt an absolute rule. Id.
35 Klein, supra note 32, at 125; see supra notes 29-34.
36 Klein, supra note 32, at 125.
37 Id. Centuries ago the marks were meant to identify a particular craftsman and, thus,
the origin of the product. MILLER & DAVIS, supra note 34, at 150. Trademarks originated
when guild members during the medieval period affixed the mark of their guild to the
goods they sold. Id.
38 Klein, supra note 32, at 125. The goods and services of the competing individual or
company do not have to be similar in nature. Id. However, it is easier for the party holding
the trademark and claiming infringement if the two marks are competing in a similar
market. Id.
39

Id.

40 See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
41 MILLER & DAVIS, supra note 34, at 153. For example, the Nike "swoosh" or the
McDonald's "arches" are trademarks that are recognized throughout the world, and, thus,
for protection, corporations trademark every phrase or logo they use in commerce. See
McDonald's Corporation, Trademark Information (Dec. 28, 2002), at http://www.speedy
arches.com/trademark.htmi.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol38/iss1/5

Frymark: Trademark Dilution: A Proposal to Stop the Infection from Spreadi

2003]

Trademark Dilution

171

42
puts every individual on notice that a specific trademark is in use.
During numerous House Committee hearings on the FTDA in 1995, a
Warner Brothers executive stated, "The basic principle is that the
trademark owner, who has spent the time and investment needed to
create and maintain the property, should be the sole determinant of how
that property is to be used in a commerce manner." 43 Under the Lanham
Act, the source of federal trademark protection, federal registration
44
ensures national protection of the trademark against other users.
Federal registration of a trademark is also preferred because it provides
easier access to the federal court system. 45 Most importantly, if the
trademark is used consistently for five years, it can become
"incontestable" upon the filing of a declaration with the Patent and
46
Trademark Office.

Id. "Trademarks and service marks are an important aspect of every business
operation." FRUCHTER, supra note 29, at 9. It is because of this that the prohibited use of
trademarks can be enforced against unlawful users. Id. Service marks are identical to
trademarks in all respects with the exception that they are intended to indicate the origin of
the services rather than the goods. MILLER & DAVIS, supra note 34, at 232.
43
Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: Hearing on H.R. 1295 and H.R. 270 Before the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. (1995) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 1295 and H.R.
2701 (statement of Niles Victor Montan, Warner Bros. Executive), 1995 Westlaw 435749.
44
FRUCHTER, supra note 29, at 169. Unregistered trademarks can be protected, but only
in the select geographic area of the United States where the use has been substantial
enough to afford protection under the state laws of the area. Id. However, it is not
necessary to register a mark federally to enjoy Lanham Act protection. Id. at 11. The
federal unfair competition statute allows for enforcement of marks that are not federally
registered and also protects against various related forms of unfair competition. Id. The
Lanham Act is divided into two discrete parts. MILLER & DAVIS, supra note 34, at 232. One
of these parts consists of all of the sections that regulate issuance of federal registration to a
wide variety of marks, words, and phrases. Id. The second section consists solely of 15
U.S.C. § 1125, section 43(c) of the Lanham Act, which forbids false statements in connection
with competition, such as cybersquatting and dilution. Id. In addition to trademarks, the
Lanham Act also permits registration of service marks, certification marks, and collective
marks. Id. Certification marks are usually those that allow an organization to indicate that
the goods or services meet certain quality or regional origin standards, thereby excluding
all others from making the same claim, which might cause confusion. Id. Collective marks
usually provide a device by which a number of people can identify themselves as members
of a certain group. Id. at 232-33.
45
15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2000); MILLER & DAVIS, supra note 34, at 153. Federal registration is
beneficial because it gives constructive notice to other individuals and affords the
registered owner nationwide protection. Id. Any cause of action involving a trademark can
be brought in either the federal or state forum since there are controlling federal and state
laws. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 29, at 214.
46
15 U.S.C. § 1065. Incontestability eliminates certain defenses that may be brought in
an infringement action. Id.
42
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47
Trademark
The public interest in trademark protection is great.
registration not only protects the manufacturer, but also safeguards the
consumer against product or service confusion.48 Unlike trademark law,
the other two anchors of intellectual property, copyright law and patent
law, focus on providing incentives to create, whereas trademark law
aims to prevent manufacturers from misleading and confusing
49
customers as to the source of the product. Thus, the goal of trademark
law is to minimize confusion in the consumer's mind and to allow the
on prior experiences with a
consumer to select a brand based
50
product.
particular
manufacturer's

Jonathan Mermin, Interpreting the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: The Logic of
the Actual Dilution Requirement, 42 B.C. L. REV. 207,208 (2000).
48
Id. (stating that the prevention of consumer confusion has been the traditional basis of
trademark protection in the United States).
49
Id.; see supra note 34. A patent is defined as "the governmental grant of a right,
privilege, or authority." BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY, supra note 30, at 1147. The grant of a
patent gives the patent owner an exclusive right to make, use, or sell an invention for a
specified period (usually twenty years). Id. A patent can only be granted if the device is
found to be novel, useful, and nonobvious. Id.
A copyright is a "property right in an original work of authorship (such as literary,
musical, artistic, photographic, or film work) fixed in any tangible medium of expression,
giving the holder the exclusive right to reproduce, adapt, distribute, perform, and display
the work." Id. at 337. The body of law relating to such works is Federal Copyright Law,
which is governed by the Copyright Act of 1976. Id. The primary objective of copyright is
not to reward the labor of authors but "[tlo promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts." Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 341 (1991). To this end,
copyright is an assurance to authors of their right to original expression. Id. However,
copyright also encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and formation conveyed by
others in a work. Id. at 350. This notion is known as the idea/expression or
fact/expression dichotomy and applies to all works of authorship. Id. The Miller court
held that:
[Clopyrightability is best defined in terms of what can and cannot be
copyrighted. Ideas can never be copyrighted. Only the particular
expression of an idea can be copyrighted. A general theme cannot be
copyrighted but its expression throughout the pattern of the work, the
sequence of its events, the development of the interplay of its
characters, and its choice of detail and dialogue can be copyrighted. If,
such an extent that the idea is capable of expression only in a more or
less stereotyped form, it is not copyrightable.
Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1368 (5th Cir. 1981).
50
See Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 663-64 (5th Cir. 2000);
Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational Basis for Trademark
Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 789, 853-56 (1997). The "[l]ikelihood of confusion is
synonymous with a probability of confusion, which is more than a mere possibility of
confusion." Westchester, 214 F.3d at 663-64. This likelihood of confusion must be
minimized in the consumer's mind. Id. at 672.

47
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The focus of trademark law is nothing short of a valiant effort to
assist the consumer. 51 However, the advantage to the customer of
having such protection comes at a cost. 52 For the public, the drawback of
trademark protection is that it may force cheaper or more efficient
products out of the market. 53 The threat of a trademark infringement
suit may deter companies from competing in certain markets that are
dominated by specific corporate powerhouses. 54 Thus, trademarks may
create barriers, precluding the entry of new products into the
marketplace. 55 Moreover, the value of the trademark not only allows the
manufacturer to keep other potential sellers out of the market, but it also
56
enables the trademark owner to charge more for the product.
The costs associated with trademark law are great.57 The consumer
at times bears a very heavy burden, not only in regard to price, but also
with respect to product confusion. 58 A vast determination to remedy
these problems gave rise to the concept and theory of trademark
59
dilution.

51 See Mermin, supra note 47, at 210.
52 Id. Trademarks may create certain barriers to the entry process of new products into
the consumer marketplace. Id. Established trademarks may even entice consumers away
from new products that bear unknown trademarks. Id.
53 See PATTISHALL, supra note 10, at 2-3; Klieger, supra note 50, at 858-59. In some areas,
precedent was derived from guild activities and the law merchant. PATrISHALL, supra note
10, at 2-3. All effort, however, was directed towards the needs of an equitable solution to
the problem of consumer confusion. Id. Therefore, the common law and later statutory
law were premised on the notion of prohibiting consumer confusion regarding the source
of goods or services. Id.; see Mermin, supra note 47, at 211. The issues that arose in the
beginning stages of trademark law were controversies over deceit. Mermin, supra note 47,
at 211.
54

See id. at 210.

55 Id. Trademarks may create barriers regarding the entry of new products into the
market because the established trademark may lure away customers from a new trademark
in the field. Id. The consumer's decision may be based on a brand, not on the tangible
qualities of the good or service. Id.
56

Id. at 207, 211.

57 Id. at 210.
58 Badger Meter, Inc. v. Grinnell Corp., 13 F.3d 1145, 1155 (7th Cir. 1994) (explaining that
consumer confusion "interferes with consumers' ability to reward or punish a
manufacturer by seeking a superior product or shunning an inferior one"); FRUCMrER,
supra note 29, at 305-07 (arguing that confusing marks interfere with the right of a
trademark owner to control the quality of the product and the consumer's ability to choose
to buy, or not buy, a product without confusion); see Mermin, supra note 47, at 207, 211.
59 See Mermin, supra note 47, at 211.
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B.

The Origin,History, and Proofof Trademark Dilution

1.

The Dawn of Trademark Law and the Evidence Required to Prove It

The original founding of trademark dilution is generally credited to
Frank Schechter. 60 In his 1927 article, The Rational Basis of Trademark
Protection, he first advocated the idea that trademark law protects against
"the gradual whittling away or dispersion of the identity." 61 Schechter's
article condemned current trademark laws for their inability to protect
trademarks from noncompeting and nonrelated goods. 62 Schechter tied
together his criticism and concept of dilution with his now-famous
example, "If you take Rolls Royce -for instance, if you allow Rolls Royce
restaurants and Rolls Royce cafeterias, and Rolls Royce pants, and Rolls
Royce candy, in 10 years you will not have the Rolls Royce mark
anymore." 63 Hence, the dilution theory was born.
The idea that trademarks had a potential value beyond their
64
identification ability and that this value could be diluted was a novelty.
Courts in Schechter's era held that the harm was to the consumer rather
than the owner of the trademark because the consumer would be duly
confused by two similar marks. 65 Schechter recognized the inherent
problems with this logic and perceived that the harm was not to the
consumer alone but also to the owner of the trademark. 66 Schechter

See MCCARTHY, supra note 22, § 24:67. Frank Schechter, a Professor at Harvard, first
introduced the concept of dilution in the United States in the 1920s and 1930s through his
writings and congressional testimony. Id. However, the dilution concept is thought to
have originated in the British and German courts. Id. United States courts in the beginning
were not very receptive to the concept of dilution, and early attempts to incorporate the
dilution theory into a federal statute were futile. Id.
61
Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REv. 813, 825
(1927). Schechter does not specifically refer to the concept laid out in his article as dilution.
PATTISHALL, supra note 10, at 359. However, Schechter did urge his readers that "the
preservation of the uniqueness of a trademark should constitute the only rational basis for
its protection." Id.
62
Reichman, supra note 29, at 112.
63
Id.
64
K. Keith Facer, The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: A Whittling Away of State
Dilution Statutes, 10 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 863, 870 (2000).
65
Id. at 870.
66
Id. The concept of the harm as injurious to the trademark owner is rooted in the
trespass of property premise. Id.
60
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argued that the uniqueness or singularity of a mark was a property right
67
belonging solely to the owner of the trademark.
The underlying rationale of the dilution doctrine is the gradual
68
whittling away of the value of a trademark that Schechter described.
Another's use of the trademark lessens the value of the mark, and such
use constitutes an invasion of the senior user's property right and
goodwill.69 In essence, such use amounts to a wrong against the senior
user, who is also the initial user of a specific trademark. 70 Consequently,
the dilution theory is necessary because it protects the senior user from
subsequent users who diminish or dilute the strong value of the mark,
even though the consumers are not confused about the source of the
goods. 71

67 See MCCARTHY, supra note 22, § 24:67. Today's market has evolved to the point where
the consumer no longer cares about the particular producer; therefore, the trademark and
its distinctiveness serve a different function. MILLER & DAVIS, supra note 34, at 180. The
market today is comprised of anonymous sources. Id. Trademarks no longer identify a
particular source; rather, they act as indicators of common ownership such as a product
line. Id. The trademark then trades on consumer loyalty and the inherent distinctiveness
of the mark instead of producer identity. Id.
68 See MCCARTHY, supra note 22, § 24:67 (commenting that dilution is not a trespass but
rather the "impairment of a trademark's selling power" analogous to a trademark's
distinctiveness being "carried away stone by stone"); Jonathan E. Moskin, Dilution or
Delusion: The Rational Limits of Trademark Protection,83 TRADEMARK REP. 122,131-32 (1993).
69 See MCCARTHY, supranote 22, § 24:67. One court stated:
The first to use a mark in the sale of goods or services is the "senior
user" of the mark and gains common law rights to the mark in the
geographic area in which the mark is used. Ownership rights flow
only from prior use-either actual or constructive. Federal registration
of a trademark or service mark cannot create rights and priority over
others who have previously used the mark in commerce, but federal
registration is prima facie evidence of the registrant's ownership and
exclusive right to use the mark and constitutes constructive use of the
mark.
R.L. Polk & Co. v. INFOUSA, Inc., No. 01-235C, 2002 WL 31513590, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 7,
2002) (quoting Allard Enters., Inc. v. Advanced Programming Res., Inc., 249 F.3d 564 (6th
Cir. 2001)).
70 See MCCARTHY, supra note 22, § 24:67. The senior user is the original user of the
trademark. Id. The junior user is the second user of the same trademark or a similar
trademark; usually the senior user brings the dilution claims against the junior user. Id.
7
Id. § 24:70. It is important to note that the theory of dilution can only be applied to the
most famous marks. Id. § 24:109. The rationale is that for dilution there cannot be a
likelihood of confusion since it is only applicable to the most famous of marks. Id.
Therefore, dilution claims do not rest on a likelihood of confusion test, as does trademark
infringement. Id. Rather dilution claims are the "whittling away" of a famous marks'
distinctiveness. Id. § 24:70.
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For dilution to occur, the consuming public must make a connection
between the trademark that both parties are using.72 However, the
connection that is made is not the same mental link that triggers the
likelihood of confusion test found in trademark infringement claims. 73
Instead, when the public perceives the junior user's application of the
mark, consumers know that there is no connection between the senior
and junior users' products or services, despite the fact that their marks
are similar or identical. 74 The factors necessary to prove a dilution claim
vary from court to court causing the current circuit split. 75
Even though dilution claims are only applicable to the most famous
of marks, like Schechter's Rolls Royce, over time, the noncompeting and
nonrelated use of the famous mark will carve away at the identity of the
mark. 76 However, because the mark is famous, the source of the goods
will still be obvious, but the mark may begin to represent something else

72

Id.

73

Id.; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25 cmt. f (1995). Different courts

have used varying standards to determine if likelihood of confusion is possible in
trademark infringement suits.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25.

Usually, the factors used in various courts differ only slightly. In White v. Samsung
Electronics America, Inc., the court used the traditional eight-step approach to determine if a
likelihood of confusion existed. 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992). This eight-step approach was
originally derived from AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979). The eight
factors to determine likelihood of confusion are: (1) strength of the plaintiff's mark; (2)
relatedness of the goods; (3) similarity of the marks; (4) evidence of actual confusion; (5)
marketing channels used; (6) likely degree of purchaser care; (7) defendant's intent in
selecting the mark; and (8) likelihood of expansion of the product lines. White, 971 F.2d at
1400; Polaroid Corp. v. Polaraid, Inc., 319 F.2d 830 (7th Cir. 1963).
74 See MCCARTHY, supra note 22, § 24:70.
75 See infra Part II for a discussion on the recent split in the circuit courts regarding the
necessary factors to prove dilution, as well as an analysis of these factors. See also supra
note 74 and accompanying text (discussing the mental connection necessary for a finding of
dilution).
76 See MCCARTHY, supra note 22, § 24:70. Courts have identified three interests that are
protected by the modern trademark law's incorporation of the dilution doctrine. Scarves
by Vera, Inc. v. Todo Imps., Ltd., 544 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1976). These are the right of the
prior user to enter a related field, the right to protect its reputation from association with
inferior goods, and the right of the public to be free from confusion and mistake. Id. When
determining whether a junior user can use the mark of a senior user, the courts consider a
number of factors. MILLER & DAVIS, supra note 34, at 188. One of these factors is the intent
of the junior user, because an actual intent to profit by someone else's mark, or worse, an
intent to deceive the public, will persuade a court to enjoin the use of the mark. Id.
Another factor is the nature of the consuming public. Id. A market of impulse buyers is
more likely to reach inappropriate conclusions based on similar marks than is a market
which is populated by sophisticated buyers. Id.
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in the public's mind.77 Although the consumers will not be confused,
because the mark is famous, they will, however, stop associating the
senior user's mark with the product the mark should identify. 78 The
concept of trademark dilution generally falls into two main categories:
"blurring" and "tarnishment." 79
a.

Dilution by Blurring

Dupont shoes, Buick aspirin, Schlitz varnish, Kodak pianos, and
Bulova gowns all are characteristic examples of dilution by "blurring."80
Dilution by blurring occurs when the junior user takes the senior user's
trademark and modifies it to identify the junior user's product or

77
Reichman, supra note 29, at 112.
78 Id. The possibility, rather than the actuality, of consumer confusion is held to be the
relevant element in modem trademark decisions incorporating the dilution doctrine.
MILLER & DAVIS, supra note 34, at 189. These cases place the burden of proof on the
defendant and also imply that once the possibility of confusion is demonstrated, it is
irrelevant that no confusion has yet occurred. Id. Courts have recognized that the
distinctiveness of the plaintiff's mark is what is being protected; even absent the use by
another, it tends to dissipate the strength of the mark. Id. Strong marks will benefit much
more than weak marks from the dilution doctrine. Id. "The greater the distinctiveness or
strength of the mark, the greater the possible injury and, therefore, the greater the
likelihood that the law will protect the mark from dilution." Id. at 190.
79 See Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1994). Deere is the world's
largest supplier of agricultural equipment. Id. at 41. Deere has used a deer design as its
trademark for identifying its products and services for over one hundred years. Id. The
Deere logo is widely recognized and valued as a prized business asset. Id. MTD, a
company that manufactures and sells lawn tractors, attempted to use the Deere trademark
without authorization. Id. The intent of MTD was to identify Deere as the market leader
and to suggest that MTD's tractor was of similar quality to Deere machinery, but less
costly. Id. MTD attempted to use the mark, although slightly altered, in several television
commercials that were submitted to ABC, NBC, and CBS. Id. Deere filed a complaint and
sought an injunction under the New York anti-dilution laws and the dilution provision
under the Lanham Act. Id. at 42. The court granted an injunction restraining MTD from
utilizing the Deere mark. Id. at 47.
In recent years, a third category of dilution has become increasingly recognized. This
third area is known as cybersquatting, or cyberpiracy. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2000). The anticybersquatting provision in the Lanham Act protects owners of marks against speculators
in domain names. Id. It also protects the time of registration of the defendant's domain
name if the mark is distinctive or famous at that time, meaning that the domain name is the
same or confusingly similar to the original mark. Id. This protection is awarded, provided
that the defendant acts with a bad faith intent as defined in section 1125(d)(1)(B)(i) of the
Lanham Act. Id. The focus of this Note will be blurring and tarnishment; cybersquatting
will not be addressed.
80
See Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1031 (2d
Cir. 1989); infra note 91 and accompanying text. These examples were listed by the New
York legislature as hypothetical examples. Mead Data, 875 F.2d at 1031.
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service.81 These products or services do not need to be in the same
competitive market as the senior user's goods or services.82 This leads to
the problem that the senior user's trademark will slowly lose its unique
qualities.8 3 As the distinctive quality of the trademark disappears, the
trademark becomes generic and will subsequently lose its legal
protection.84 Dilution by blurring has been described as the classic
"whittling away of an established trade-mark's selling power and value
85
through the unauthorized use by others upon dissimilar products."
Thus, dilution by blurring raises the possibility that the mark will lose its
86
capacity to serve as an exclusive identifier of the senior user's product.
However, consumer confusion about the source or product affiliation is
irrelevant. 87 Confusion is never an issue in dilution claims because
dilution is reserved for only the most famous of marks.88 In other words,
if a mark is sufficiently famous for a dilution claim, consumers will
presumably not be confused by it.89
Blurring requires that there be some mental association between the
"marks of the marks." 90 This described mental association can be
triggered where the senior user's mark is famous and, thus, has a
distinctive quality for a large portion of the junior user's market.91 A
classic example of dilution by blurring is General Motors Corp. v. Let's
Make a Deal.92 General Motors has developed and sold Hummer vehicles

81 Deere, 41 F.3d at 43.
82 See MCCARTHY, supranote 22, § 24:68.
83 Deere, 41 F.3d at 43; see also Stop the Olympic Prison v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 489 F.
Supp. 1112, 1123 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
84 Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1489 (10th Cir. 1987). The
Court noted that "[tihe paradigmatic dilution case involves the situation where the same or
very similar marks are being used on vastly different products. Examples might include
BEEFEATER used for a restaurant; DIOR used for a cleaning establishment; BACARDI
used for jewelry; PLAYBOY used for auto repair." Id.
85 Mead Data, 875 F.2d at 1028; MCCARTHY, supra note 22, § 24:68; see also Reichman, supra
note 29, at 112.
6
Deere,41 F.3d at 43.
87
See MCCARTHY, supranote 22, § 24:68.
88

Id.

89

Id.

90 Id.
91 Id. (quoting Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026,
1031 (2d Cir. 1989)).
92 223 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1188 (D. Nev. 2002). Plaintiff alleged claims for trademark and
trade dress dilution, federal trademark infringement and counterfeiting, false designation
of origin or sponsorship, false advertising, trade dress infringement, and common law
trademark infringement. Id. The plaintiff originally sought injunctive relief as well as
damages against the defendants. Id.
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since 1981. 93 The defendants owned and operated "Let's Make a Deal," a
used car lot, in Reno, Nevada. 94 According to the plaintiff, the
defendants had been manufacturing "car kits" that captured all the
unique traits of the Hummer vehicles and advertised them on their
website. 95 The court held that proof of trademark dilution was present
based on "blurring" because General Motors' marketing efforts
succeeded in strengthening its marks, and it appeared that the
defendants' use of similar marks would blur the public's ability to
identify the true maker of the Hummer vehicle. 96 Thus, the trademark's
97
capacity to serve as a unique identifier was diminished.

Id. A Hummer vehicle is a type of sports utility vehicle that gained popularity
through its use as a military vehicle during the Gulf War. Id. Since 1999, General Motors
has owned all the rights to the trademarks and trade dress of Hummer vehicles as well as
the goodwill that the vehicles have come to symbolize. Id. Plaintiff, General Motors, not
only owns the registered trademark for Hummer vehicles, but also the Hummer grill,
which comprises the nose and grill of the vehicle. Id. General Motors alleges that they
have spent hundreds of millions of dollars towards developing and advertising Hummer
vehicles worldwide. Id. As a result, throughout the world, Hummer vehicles are
recognized as a symbol of quality and uniqueness. Id.
94
Id.
95
Id. The advertising took place on the defendants' website, http://www.hnmv.com.
Id. Ultimately, the court ordered the dismantling of the website in favor of General Motors.
Id. at 1197.
9
Id. at 1193. The court reasoned that the plaintiff must show a likelihood of confusion
as to its trade dress through the application of the Sleekcraft factors. Id. at 1196. These
factors should be applied because they touch on the defendant's general considerations,
intent, strength, similarity, and proximity. Id. The court ultimately restrained the
defendants from any manufacturing, advertising, marketing, and/or selling car kits that
use, copy, misappropriate, or are confusingly similar to the trade dress and shape of
Hummer vehicles. Id. at 1197.
97
Id. at 1192. The court held that if a plaintiff can demonstrate a likelihood of prevailing
on the infringement and unfair competition claims, irreparable harm can be inferred. Id. at
1197. The court held that in the present case irreparable injury could be inferred from the
strong showing of injury that the plaintiff presented. Id. The court noted that it was not
enough that the defendants had eliminated their website. Id. The court also stated that
there were still other means that the defendants could use to sell their car kits. Id.
Therefore, the plaintiff was not denied the presumption of permanent harm. Id. It should
be noted that the case may arise in which the junior user's mark will become so famous that
it will overwhelm the senior user's mark. Id. However, this is usually a rarity and, thus,
blurring will not be found. Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, Inc., 875 F.2d
1026, 1031 (2d Cir. 1989); GOLDSTEIN, supra note 29, at 85.
In Mead Data, Toyota sought to associate Lexus with luxury and automobiles. 875
F.2d at 1038. Mead Data feared that would overwhelm their Lexus association with
"indispensability and economy." Id. Judge Sweet concurred in this judgment and offered
a six-factor test based on the New York anti-dilution statute. Id. at 1035. This test has come
to be known as the "Sweet Test" for dilution. Id. Judge Sweet's six factors are: (1)
similarity of the marks; (2) similarity of the products covered by the marks; (3)
93
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Dilution by Tarnishment

Dilution by "tarnishment" occurs when the consumer's capacity to
correlate a trademark with the appropriate goods or services has been
lessened. 98 In general, the threat of tarnishment is an issue when the
good name and reputation of the senior user's trademark is associated
with goods or services which are of a "shoddy" quality or when the
tarnishing mark conjures up related associations that clash with the
The effect of the junior user's
owner's use of the trademark. 99
unauthorized use in a tarnishment case is to degrade or dilute the
distinctive quality of the mark. 00
There are two approaches to tarnishment: a broad approach and a
narrow approach.10 1 Under the broad approach, the dilution doctrine's
prohibition encompasses any unauthorized use of a mark in various
contexts that diminish the trademark's positive attributes. 10 2 If the
dilution doctrine is applied narrowly, it includes only unauthorized
commercial uses of a mark that are related to goods or services of poor
10 3
quality that lack the esteem associated with the trademark.

sophistication of the consumers; (4) predatory intent; (5) renown of the senior mark; and (6)
renown of the junior mark. Id. However, in recent years this test has been criticized as not
being relevant or particularly helpful, specifically with suits for dilution by blurring.
MCCARTHY, supra note 22, § 24:94.2.
98
Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1994); MCCARTHY, supra note
22, § 24:69. The court in Deere held that in tarnishment cases:
[T]he trademark's reputation and commercial value might be
diminished because the public will associate the lack of quality or lack
of prestige in the defendant's goods with the plaintiff's unrelated
goods, or because the defendant's use reduces the trademark's
reputation and standing in the eyes of consumers as a wholesome
identifier of the owner's products or services.
Deere, 41 F.3d at 43.
99 See MCCARTHY, supra note 22, § 24:69. The key with the tarnishment concept is that
the tarnishing party's mark must be of a poor quality for tarnishment to occur; therefore,
tarnishment will not occur if the junior user's mark is reputable. See Reichman, supra note
29, at 112.
100 PATTISHALL, supra note 10, at 380. Dilution can occur by the tarnishing of the positive
associations engendered by a trademark, as well as by diminishment of the trademark's
distinctiveness. Id.; MCCARTHY, supra note 22, § 24:69.
101 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 29, at 86; see infra notes 102-03.
102 Id. The dilution doctrine that is referred to in the text is the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act of 1995. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000).
103 Id. § 1125(c).
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The traditional example of dilution by tarnishment is a parody. 1°4
For example, in Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Topps Chewing
Gum,10 5 Garbage Pail Kids were established to be crude depictions of
dolls that had comparable features to the plaintiff's Cabbage Patch
Dolls.106 Subsequently, the court held that there had been dilution by
tarnishment. 107 The court stated that, where the marks were similar and
there was proof that contested use could possibly injure the plaintiff
manufacturer's commercial reputation or even dilute the distinctive
10 8
quality of its mark, dilution by tarnishment could be found.
In contrast, as in Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd.,109 some
courts have examined parody use with trademarks and have held that
some consumers may see a parody in poor taste, but that it is not likely
that the parody will create an "unwholesome, unsavory, or degrading
association" with the plaintiff's name. 110 Therefore, in these types of
cases, a claim for tarnishment cannot be supported."'

See MCCARTHY, supra note 22, § 24:69; Reichman, supra note 29, at 112.
642 F. Supp. 1031 (N.D. Ga. 1986).
106 Id. at 1032. Since July 1982, Original Appalachian Works has marketed its dolls under
the trademark "Cabbage Patch Kids." Id. Over forty million Cabbage Patch Kid dolls have
been sold. Id. The defendant, Topps Chewing Gum, Inc. ("Topps"), was founded in 1938.
Id. For fifty years it has produced various entertainment products designed for children,
particularly Bazooka Bubble Gum and baseball trading cards. Id. In November 1984,
Topps filed to register the trademark "Garbage Pail Kids." Id. In May 1985, Topps began
manufacturing and distributing the first series of Garbage Pail Kids stickers and cards. Id.
The Garbage Pail Kids stickers cynically depict dolls with features very similar to Cabbage
Patch Kids dolls in rude, aggressive, and harmful settings. Id. The cards gained extreme
popularity in early 1986, and Topps expanded its products regarding Garbage Pail Kids to
items such as T-shirts, school notebooks, balloons, etc. Id. This manufacturing and
marketing scheme was very successful, and overall more than 800 million stickers have
been sold. Id.
107 Id.
108 Id. The court reasoned that in order to prevail under such dilution by tarnishment
claim, the plaintiff needed to show that the marks in question were similar and that "the
contested use was likely to injure [the plaintiff's] commercial reputation or dilute the
distinctive quality of its marks." Id. at 1039.
109 828 F.2d 1482,1489 (10th Cir. 1987).
110 Id. The court found that "because of the parody aspect of Lardashe, it is not likely that
public identification of Jordache with the plaintiff will be eroded; indeed, parody tends to
increase public identification of a plaintiff's mark with the plaintiff." Id. at 1489-90. The
court went on to hold that the continued existence of Lardashe jeans would not cause
Jordache to lose any of the distinctive qualities that its mark had acquired for jeans and
apparel. Id. at 1490. The court's reasoning was that it would be rather unlikely that the
public would assume that the same manufacturer would use very different marks on
virtually the same product. Id. at 1491. Therefore, its holding was justified because the
104

105
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Courts are reluctant to find dilution by tarnishment in cases that
112
raise First Amendment issues. In L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers,Inc.,
the First Circuit reversed the grant of an injunction in favor of L.L. Bean
because it impinged on First Amendment rights. 113 The court concluded
that if parodists were deprived of the occasion to poke fun at symbols
and names that are commonplace in our society, it would constitute an
infringement on protected expression. 114 In addition, dilution through

Lanham Act requires that the likelihood of confusion test be satisfied to establish
tarnishment; however, the court reasoned that the likelihood of confusion test is not the
only way to prove this type of tarnishment. Id. Thus, there was no likelihood of an injury
found in this case and the dilution claim failed. Id.
1l
See, e.g., id. at 1489. The owner of the trademark "Jordache" brought an infringement
suit against a jean manufacturer who sold blue jeans for larger women depicting a smiling
pig above the word "Lardashe" on the seat of the pants. Id. at 1482. The court held that an
intent to parody did exist, but that the trademark owner failed to show that his mark,
Jordache, was diluted or tarnished. Id.
112 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1987).
113 Id. at 34. The plaintiff-appellee, L.L. Bean, Inc., brought this lawsuit when High
Society magazine published a parody of L.L. Bean's well-known catalog. Id. at 27. The
defendant-appellant, Drake Publishers ("Drake"), owns High Society, which is a monthly
periodical that features adult entertainment. Id. In its October 1984 issue, a two-page
article was published entitled "L.L. Beam's Back-To-School-Sex-Catalog." Id. The article
was published on the magazine's table of contents page as "humor" and "parody." Id. The
article exhibited a reproduction of L.L. Bean's trademark and displayed pictures of nude
models in "sexually explicit positions." Id. L.L. Bean sought a temporary restraining order
to remove the October 1984 issue from circulation. Id. The complaint primarily alleged
trademark infringement, unfair competition, trademark dilution, deceptive trade practices,
interference with prospective business advantage, and trade libel. Id. L.L. Bean's request
for a temporary restraining order was denied by the district court. Id. Later, both parties
sought claims for summary judgment. Id. The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of Drake on the claims for trade libel and interference with prospective business
advantage. Id. However, it rejected granting summary judgment to both parties on L.L.
Bean's claims for trademark infringement, unfair competition, and deceptive trade
practices, leaving the question of "likelihood of confusion" for ruling at trial. Id. The court
of appeals held that the application of Maine's anti-dilution statute to the magazine's
noncommercial parody of trademark violated the First Amendment. Id. However, the
court rejected Drake's claim that the Maine statute did not encompass allegations of
tarnishment caused by parody. Id. at 27. Therefore, the court held that enjoining the
publication of a parody to prevent trademark dilution did not offend the First Amendment.
Id. The court stated, "The limits imposed on a trademark owner's property rights
demonstrate that the constitutional issue raised here cannot be dispensed with by simply
asserting that Bean's property right need not yield to the exercise of First Amendment
rights." Id. at 29.
114 Id. The court in L.L. Bean concluded, "Denying parodists the opportunity to poke fun
at symbols and names which have become woven into the fabric of our daily life, would
constitute a serious curtailment of a protected form of expression." Id. at 34. Throughout
the L.L. Bean opinion, the court indicated in dicta that it would have upheld an application
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blurring and tarnishment have been given recognition through the
11 5
passing of state anti-dilution laws.
2.

State Trademark Dilution Doctrines

Initially courts and scholars disapproved of the arguments Schechter
made regarding the theory of dilution.116 Consequently, it took twenty
years for courts to begin to warm up to the concept of dilution." 7 In
1947, Massachusetts passed the first anti-dilution law.118 Several other

of the statute if the statute was limited to the use of the mark in connection with the
marketing of goods or services. Id.
115
MILLER & DAVIS, supra note 34, at 191; Paul Edward Kim, Comment, Preventing
Dilution of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act: Vhy the FTDA Requires Actual Economic Harm,
150 U. PA. L. REV. 719, 726 (2001).
116
Kim, supra note 115, at 726.
117
MILLER & DAVIS, supra note 34, at 191. It has been reasoned that:
Although the Lanham Act has been amended so that the confusion
necessary for infringement is not limited merely to that between
competing goods, but is extended to confusion generally so as to
include the dilution doctrine, that development has occurred only
within the last twenty years. In addition, federal courts have been
somewhat reluctant to embrace the dilution doctrine wholeheartedly
and therefore have construed the "confusion" requirement with
varying degrees of strictness. Finally, even with federal acceptance of
the dilution doctrine, many marks that are either not registered or
otherwise ineligible for registration are protected solely by state law.
Id. Until recently, state law was made up of entirely common law, and there has been
substantial judicial resistance to the dilution doctrine in the state courts. Id.
118 David Sven Villwock, Legislative Update: The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, 6
DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL'Y 213, 215 (1996). The state laws largely followed the
International Trademark Association ("ITA") Model and provided for an injunction upon a
successful finding of a likelihood of dilution. Id. However, even though the state
legislatures gave an apparent power to the courts to apply the dilution principles, courts
were hesitant to do so between 1933 and 1977. Id. The only court to apply this law was the
Seventh Circuit in the Polaroid case of 1963. Polaroid Corp. v. Polaraid, Inc., 319 F.2d 830
(7th Cir. 1963). In that case, the court concluded that the use of the term "Polaraid" diluted
the trademark of the plaintiff, a marketer of cameras, Polaroid. Id. In Polaroid,the record
indicated that there were several instances of confusion as to the parties' identities. Id. at
837. The court held that the anti-dilution statute should be applied to the present case. Id.
It was not until 1977, in the Allied case, that a court fully exposed dilution to the
public. Allied Maint. Corp. v. Allied Mech. Trades, Inc., 369 N.E.2d 1162 (N.Y. 1977). The
court addressed dilution by stating, "The evil which the Legislature sought to remedy was
not public confusion caused by similar products or services sold by competitors, but a
cancer-like growth of dissimilar products or services which feeds upon the business
reputation of an established distinctive trade-mark or name." Id. at 1165. Despite the
definition of dilution provided by the court, the court ultimately held that the name Allied
had not attained a distinctive, arbitrary, or fanciful nature. Id. This reasoning arose
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states followed, passing similar anti-dilution laws.119 All of these laws
were based largely on the International Trademark Association ("ITA")
model. 120 The ITA encouraged states to adopt anti-dilution laws and to
allow an injunction as a remedy for dilution upon a finding of a
121
likelihood of dilution.
Although a majority of states adopted anti-dilution laws, the state
laws lacked uniformity, providing a "patch-quilt system" of state antidilution statutes. 122 Moreover, plaintiffs were often forum-shopping by
seeking out the state they believed would be the most sympathetic to
their dilution claims.1 23 Another problem with the state dilution laws
was that the only remedy available was an injunction. 124 However,
because only half of the states had anti-dilution laws and because the
states that did not recognize dilution were unwilling to enforce an
injunction from another state, the effectiveness of injunctions became a

because the court was unconvinced that the name Allied was not associated in the public's
mind to represent cleaning and maintenance services. Id.
119
Villwock, supra note 118, at 215. Currently the states with dilution statutes are the
following: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia,
Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, West Virginia,
and Wyoming. PATiSHALL, supra note 10, at 392. Ohio has also recognized some common
law dilution claims. Id.
120
Id. State anti-dilution statutes traditionally disregard the requirement of competition
and confusion between goods. MILLER & DAVIS, supra note 34, at 192. In addition, the
statutes forbid any practices that may confuse consumers as to product and service sources.
Id. These state statutes allow owners to enforce their marks through a wide range of
products and markets. Id.
121
Villwock, supra note 118, at 215. The rationale behind the incorporation of the state
dilution statutes was, and still is, the protection of the distinctive quality of a mark, even in
the absence of likelihood of confusion, against the use of another that may degrade the
mark's distinctiveness. PATTISHALL, supra note 10, at 392. State dilution laws also typically
protect the trademark owner from the tarnishment of its mark. Id.
122 Id. Initially, states were very hesitant to adopt dilution statutes, and once these
statutes were in place, courts often failed to utilize them. Id. In recent years, however,
states have become more supportive and frequent in the application of dilution statutes.
Id.; Kim, supra note 115, at 726.
123 Kim, supra note 115, at 726.
124 Villwock, supra note 118, at 215.
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These problems in the state system prompted the

passing of the FTDA in 1995.126
3.

The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995

Congress amended the Lanham Act of 1946 by passing the FTDA of
127
1995 and provided, therein, a cause of action for trademark dilution.
With overwhelming approval from both the House and the Senate, the
FTDA was officially signed into law on January 16, 1996.128 The statute
defines dilution as, "the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to
identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or
absence of (1) competition between the owner of the famous mark and
other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception." 129 To
prove a successful claim of dilution, the plaintiff must first show that a
mark is famous and that it warrants dilution protection. 130 Once the

125 Hearing on H.R. 1295 and H.R. 270, supra note 43 (discussing dilution remedies by
Mary Ann Alford, Executive Vice President of the International Trademark Association);
Villwock, supra note 118, at 215. The ITA was a huge advocate of the FTDA, which became
effective on January 16, 1996. MCCARTHY, supranote 22, § 24:69.
126 15 U.S.C. § 1127(B)(2)(2) (2000).
127 Kim, supra note 115, at 726; see supra note 44. The Lanham Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. §
1051, is the federal statute governing trademark rights. FRUCHTER, supra note 29, at 9-10. In
November 1989, it was extensively amended and has since been periodically amended. Id.
In 1995, the FTDA was added to the Lanham Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1127(c). It is expected that
the federal dilution statute will co-exist with the state statutes that are in place.
PATT1SHALL, supra note 10, at 392. Thus, the federal statute does not preempt state law. Id.
128 15 U.S.C. § 1127; Kim, supranote 115, at 726.
129 15 U.S.C. § 1127; MCCARTHY, supra note 22, § 24:88.
130 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1). Under the FTDA, the eight non-exclusive factors that a court
may consider and weigh, when deciding whether a mark is famous, are as follows:
(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark; (B)
the duration and extent of the use of the mark in connection with the
goods or services with which the mark is used; (C) the duration and
extent of advertising and publicity of the mark; (D) the geographical
extent of the trading area in which the mark is used; (E) the channels of
trade for the goods or services with which the mark is used; (F) the
degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and channels of
trade used by the mark's owner and the person against whom the
injunction is sought; (G) the nature and extent of use of the same or
similar marks by third parties; and (H) whether the mark was
registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of February 20,
1905, or on the principal register.
Id. The state statutes that recognize dilution often do not require that a mark be "strong" or
"well-known" for the dilution doctrine to apply. PATrlSHALL, supra note 10, at 392.
However, depending on the state, certain judicial opinions have read this factor into the
court's dilution analysis. See Fruit of the Loom, Inc. v. Girouard, 994 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir.
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plaintiff has proven these two elements, the plaintiff must next establish
that the defendant's use of the mark caused the trademark to be diluted
131
and, thus, to lose some of its distinctiveness.
The FTDA offers an injunction as the primary remedy for a
successful dilution lawsuit. 32 In very limited instances, the FTDA also
offers damages as a remedy. 33 However, the award of damages is only a
possibility if the infringing party is found to have "willfully intended to
trade on the owner's reputation or to cause dilution of the famous
mark." 134 In such cases, the party whose mark has been infringed may
be entitled to any or all of the following: profits, treble damages, and the
destruction of the infringing articles. 135 However, there are traditionally
136
some differences between state and federal anti-dilution laws.
4.

A Comparison of State and Federal Dilution Statutes

A large distinction between most state statutes and the federal
statute is that, as a prerequisite for protection under the federal statute,
the mark must be famous. 137 Most state statutes do not have this
requirement.138 Rather, liability may arise under state law when a junior
user's exercise of a mark produces a mental connection between the
junior and senior users' marks in the mind of the consumer. 139 The

1993) (holding that Fruit of the Loom for undergarments was not diluted by Fruit Flops
and Fruit Cups regarding thongs and bustiers).
131 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).
132 Id. § 1125(c). Lanham Act § 1116 provides for injunctive relief; but if the infringing
party "willfully intended" to infringe, then remedies under §§ 1117(a), 1118, and 1125(c)
may be assessed. Id. § 1125(c)(2).
133 Id. § 1125(c); see infra notes 141-42.
134 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c); McCARTHY, supra note 22, § 24:99; see infra notes 141-42.
135 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c); see infra notes 141-42. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1117(a), 1118,
1125(c)(2); MCCARTHY, supra note 22, § 24:99.
136 Miles J. Alexander & Michael K. Heilbronner, Dilution Under Section 43(c) of the Lanham
Act, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 93, 102 (1996).
137 See supra notes 130, 136 and accompanying text.
138 Alexander & Heilbroner, supra note 136, at 102.
139 Id. Therefore, as a result, the senior user's mark is no longer able to function as an
unique identifier of its goods or services. Id. In addition:
Trademark infringement disputes are most often resolved by courts
using injunctive relief. Injunctive relief is often employed in cases of
unintentional infringement where there has been no harm to the
trademark owner. It is also employed in cases where there may be
great harm to the trademark owner. These situations usually come up
clearly and quickly on the owner's "radar screen" and action is taken
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federal statute also provides national relief in the form of an injunction,
something that the state statutes cannot provide. 140 Moreover, monetary
damages are available under the federal statute.141 To award a plaintiff
1 42
damages, the plaintiff must prove that the trademark is famous.
5.

Proving Dilution: Surveys and Balancing Tests

As mentioned, a trademark must be famous before it can be the
subject of a dilution claim under the FTDA.143 The determination of
whether a trademark is famous involves the consideration of several
factors.14 Most of these factors can be proven through affidavit evidence
and individual testimony. 45 Courts also encourage parties to submit
only first-hand knowledge of factors relating to the famous aspect of the
146
specific entity.
A party can also prove that a mark is famous through the use of
consumer surveys. 147 These surveys should demonstrate that potential

immediately. Prompt injunctive relief before damage occurs can be a
proper resolution.
Id.
See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text (stating that most state statutes do not
recognize monetary damages as a potential remedy).
142 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000).
143
Id.; see supra note 130 and accompanying text (discussing the famous factors under the
14

141

FTDA).
144 See supra note 130.
145
Reichman, supra note 29, at 134; BAILA H. CELEDONIA & RICHARD L. KIRKPATRICK,
PROVING LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION IN TRADEMARK LAW 107-08

(1996).

Reichman, supra note 29, at 134. Often surveys are the primary form of evidence used
to establish the various elements of an infringement action. FRUCHTER, supra note 29, at
271. Surveys can be used to establish factors like secondary meaning, or a lack thereof, and
likelihood of confusion. Id. Courts could also draw a negative inference from the absence
of survey evidence: (1) that the party does not care enough to do one, or (2) that the party
did one and its results were not favorable to the surveying party's position. Id. Also, the
key in surveys is to ensure that one seeks a relevant population and asks fair and unbiased
questions. Id.
147 Reichman, supra note 29, at 134. For a proper trademark/likelihood of confusion
survey to be carried out, the following is one proposed method:
The analysis of a survey begins by obtaining the survey report,
the underlying questionnaires to the report and any affidavit based
upon the questionnaires and/or report. Presumably one already has
all of the relevant marketing information. With this material in hand
and preferably with the help of a survey expert of one's own, the
analysis can proceed by applying the principles for designing a sound
survey. Each element of the survey being analyzed should be
examined in light of the realities of the marketplace. The elements to
146
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consumers can identify the mark. 148 If consumers cannot identify the
trademark, then the mark cannot be considered famous under the

be examined are the definition of the universe, the sampling method
and size of sample, the survey setting, the questionnaire, the execution
of the survey incuding the coding and tabulation of the answers to the
survey questions, the statistical analysis made or not made, and finally,
Assuming the author of the survey is
the conclusions drawn.
experienced, the sampling method and execution of the survey are
probably sound and do not require a lot of attention. The focus can be
on the definition of the universe, the survey setting, questionnaire and
analysis with sample size, coding and tabulation becoming a part of
the data analysis process.
CELEDONIA & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 145, at 107-08.
148 Reichman, supra note 29, at 112. One possible way that consumers may not be able to
identify the mark is due to genericism. See supra note 29. The genericism critique
specifically centers on a generic survey design used in an effort to show secondary
meaning and thus probable confusion. CELEDONIA & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 145, at 108.
For example:
A Teflon-type survey was conducted for a plaintiff who wanted to
show that its mark was not "merely descriptive" as contended by the
defendant. Before analyzing this survey it would be helpful to be
familiar with the Teflon survey which generally finds favor with the
courts. In the Teflon study, the terms common name and brand name
were explained to the respondents using automobile and Chevrolet as
In the survey being critiqued, the terms common
examples.
name/descriptive name and brand name were explained to the
respondents using one example for the common name/descriptive
name category and one name for the brand name example. Both
examples were drawn from a product category related to the one in
question. In selecting the examples, the expert introduced a subtle
bias. The common name/descriptive name example was a common
name and the respondents were told this name identified a product
type. No descriptive name was given. Thus, the respondents in
evaluating the name at issue which was descriptive were put into a
frame of reference in which the name at issue seemed more like a
An evaluation of the responses supported this
brand name.
conclusion. Over 25 percent of the respondents who said the name in
question was a brand gave the reason for their response in the form of
deductive reasoning -it was not a generic or common name, it did not
say what the product was, therefore it was a brand.
In addition to the bias in the example, the other names selected to
accompany the name at issue created a bias. The two brand names
selected both had a word in common with the name at issue and the
common names did not. The two brand names selected were also
weak brand names in the sense of not being readily recognized. One
of the common names was a very well known common name. The
other common name was well known as such, but not to the same
degree. Thus the selection of names created a bias toward finding the
name at issue to be a brand name. The results supported this
observation as well because 85 percent of the respondents identified
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FTDA. 149 In the language of the FTDA, one of the factors for determining
whether a mark is famous is the degree of recognition in the trading
areas and trading channels of the mark's owner and of the potential
diluting party. 150 This factor could be easily proven by adequate survey
evidence. 151 At the very least, the party bringing the dilution suit must
show that there is a mental connection between the famous senior mark
152
and the junior user's mark in the public mind.
Once a court determines
connection can be established
trademarks, a more complex
trademark dilution proven? 153

that a mark
between the
and difficult
This question

is famous and a mental
junior and senior users'
question arises: how is
has baffled the courts for

the well known common name as such and 69 percent identified the
other common name as such. Only 41 percent and 36 percent
identified the brand name as such. The name at issue was identified
by 33 percent of the respondents as a brand name. Most respondents
did not know whether the names being evaluated were
common/descriptive names or brand names.
CELEDONIA, & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 145, at 108-10.
149 MCCARTHY, supra note 22, § 24:92.1. The following marks were held to be famous
under the 1996 FTDA: AOL (internet provider); Barbie (doll); Budweiser (beer); The
Greatest Show on Earth (slogan for circus); Hotmail (e-mail service); National Basketball
Association (logo); Porsche (autos); Prozac (anti-depression drug); Tylenol (analgesic). Id.
The following marks were alleged to be famous but were held not to be famous enough to
warrant protection under the FTDA: Appleseed (public advocacy group); Authority
(sporting goods retailer); Avery Dennison (office supplies); Bongo (wearing apparel); Clue
(board game); Fun Ship (cruise line); King of the Mountain Sports (camouflage clothing);
Petro (truck stop services); Tornado (commercial vacuum cleaners); and Weather Guard
(vehicle tool boxes for contractors). Id. § 24:92.2
150 PATTISHALL, supra note 10, at 383; see supra note 130.
151 PATISHALL, supra note 10, at 383.

152 Id. A survey may also help in this regard to show a mental connection in the
consumer's mind. Id. See generally Fruit of the Loom, Inc. v. Girouard, 994 F.2d 1359 (9th
Cir. 1993); Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1026 (2d Cir.
1989). In the Ringling Brothers case, survey evidence was extensively relied upon to attempt
to show that a mark was famous. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc.
v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 462-63 (4th Cir. 1999). However, the Fourth
Circuit reasoned that survey evidence alone is not enough to support a dilution claim. Id.
at 463; PArISHALL, supranote 10, at 383.
153 Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 457. Ringling Brothers contends that the real interpretive
problem for the courts has been how harm to the senior mark's selling power due to a
junior user's mark could be proven. Id. The Ringling Brothers court stated that "logic has
compelled agreement" that as a threshold issue some mental connection of the two marks
in the consumer mind must be evident in order to allow an association between use and
harm. Id. But, Ringling Brothers stated that beyond this common ground, much difficulty
remains. Id. Ringling Brothers raises the question of, "how, in the absence of any consumer
confusion as to source, can harm to the senior mark's selling power traceable to the junior
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years, and they have repeatedly argued over the level of proof required
under the FTDA.154 Recently, two approaches to proving dilution
dominated.155 The first view held that relief under the FTDA required
proof of actual harm to the selling power of the trademark. 56 The
second declared that a likelihood of dilution was sufficient. 157 The
dispute arose primarily because, on the one hand, the FTDA states that
liability is established by acts that "cause dilution." 158 On the other
hand, under state statutes, liability typically arises where the act in
159
question is "likely to cause dilution."
The Fourth Circuit has concluded that a successful dilution claim
requires proof of actual dilution. 60 In Ringling Brothers-Barnum & Bailey
Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Division of Travel Development,161 Utah's use
of the mark "The Greatest Snow on Earth" was held not to have diluted
162
the trademark of Ringling Brothers' "The Greatest Show on Earth."

mark's use be proved even as likely future fact?" Id. On this issue, a majority opinion has
not emerged in judicial opinions nor applications of state laws. Id.
154 PATrISHALL, supranote 10, at 378.

155 See generally Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 223 (2d Cir. 1999); Ringling
Bros., 170 F.3d at 458; PATTISHALL, supra note 10, at 378.
156 Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 458. The court held that proof of actual harm was what
Congress directly intended when the FTDA was enacted in 1995. Id. at 459; PATrISHALL,
supra note 10, at 378. The belief that the FTDA requires proof of actual harm is the theory
that is enforced in the Ringling Brothers case.
157 Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 223; PATTISHALL, supra note 10, at 378.
158 PATrISHALL, supranote 10, at 378.

Id. Traditionally, state anti-dilution statutes require only a likelihood of dilution for a
plaintiff/senior user to prevail on a claim. Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 459. Several circuits,
including the Second Circuit, have held that this is the proper standard to apply, whereas,
the actual dilution standard is not. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 208.
160 Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 449.
161 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999).
162 Id. at 450. Since 1872 to the present, Ringling Brothers and its predecessors have
presented its circus to the public as the "Greatest Show on Earth." Id. Ringling Brothers
applied for federal trademark registration in 1961 for its entertainment services, specifically
its circus. Id. Since federal trademark approval, Ringling Brothers has utilized its mark to
market and advertise its circus throughout the continental United States. Id. Ringling
Brothers markets its circus through the use of its trademark, the Greatest Show, in
mediums such as television, videos, outdoor billboards, direct mail, press announcements,
posters, program books, and souvenirs, and also through promotional advertising with
other companies. Id. In the 1997 fiscal year, Ringling Brothers spent about 19 million on
advertising. Id.
Ringling Brothers, on average, performs 1000 shows annually and entertains a yearly
audience of about twelve million people in ninety-five cities. Id. Ringling Brothers
contended that over seventy million people every year were exposed to the Greatest Show
trademark in correlation with the revenues from the circus. Id. Ringling Brothers revenues
from its circus and items bearing its mark are quite considerable, exceeding 103 million for
'59

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol38/iss1/5

Frymark: Trademark Dilution: A Proposal to Stop the Infection from Spreadi

2003]

Trademark Dilution

191

The court examined whether the Ringling mark had been diluted by
blurring and concluded that insufficient evidence of dilution was
presented. 163
The Fourth Circuit interpreted the FTDA to require proof of actual
harm.164 To successfully win the dilution claim, Ringling Brothers had to
show (1) a sufficient similarity between the junior and senior marks that
would evoke an "instinctive mental association" of the two by a relevant
universe of consumers which (2) is the effective cause of (3) an actual
lessening of the senior mark's selling power, expressed as "its capacity to

the fiscal year ending in January 1997. Id. In addition, because the Ringling Brothers mark,
the Greatest Show, is so well recognized, Ringling Brothers receives a large amount of free
publicity. Id. Ringling Brothers initiated this action seeking injunctive relief and monetary
relief on the theory that Utah's use of the Greatest Snow diluted Ringling Brothers "the
Greatest Show" and, thus, violated the FTDA. Id. at 452.
The defendant, Utah Division of Travel Development, is an agency of the State of
Utah. Id. at 451. Utah contended that as early as 1962, it began using "the Greatest Snow"
mark to promote tourism in the state. Id. Every year until this lawsuit, with the exceptions
of 1963, 1977, and 1989, Utah had used this mark in its advertisements appearing in various
magazines. Id. The Utah Ski Association had also been authorized by the State of Utah to
use "the Greatest Snow" mark in association with Utah tourism. Id. Utah sought
registration of the Greatest Snow mark in 1975 with the State of Utah and, subsequently,
renewed this registration in 1985 and 1995. Id. Utah applied for and registered the
Greatest Snow mark in 1988 with the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Id. At
the time of registration, Ringling Brothers opposed Utah's application for the mark. Id. at
452. However, Utah was granted its federal registration in January 1997. Id.
163 Id. The FTDA's legislative history indicated to the Ringling Brothers court that
Congress understood that dilution could occur either through blurring or tarnishment. Id.
In Ringling Brothers, both parties accepted that fact as a proper reflection of Congressional
intent, and further agreed that dilution by blurring was the issue in the case. Id. Ringling
Brothers had to prove the following three factors to successfully win its dilution claim: (1)
that its mark was "famous;" (2) that Utah adopted its mark after Ringling Brothers had
become famous; and (3) that Utah's mark diluted Ringling Brothers by blurring it. Id. In
the district court, Ringling Brothers presented evidence through surveys to show that its
mark was famous, but the district court ultimately rejected this evidence. Id. at 453.
164 Id. at 458. When the court acknowledged that actual harm was the proper test for
dilution, the court noted that marks could have their selling power weakened by other
factors than just the use of the mark by a junior party. Id. at 465. Thus, the court held that
the Mead Data factor analysis was inappropriate under the reading of the FTDA because
those factors were not closely related to actual harm. Id. at 464 (citing Mead Data Cent.,
Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1035 (2d Cir. 1989)); see supra note 97.
However, Ringling Brothers acknowledged that inferring actual harm from factors of
"consumer sophistication" and "predatory intent" was a "chancy process at best." Ringling
Bros., 170 F.3d at 464. The court also reasoned that "contextual factors" such as the extent
of the junior marks exposure, similarity of the marks, and the strength of the senior mark,
would be relevant. Id.; PATrTISHALL, supra note 10, at 378.
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identify and distinguish goods or services." 165 The Fourth Circuit stated
that to establish actual harm, there are several methods of proof. 16 6 The
means of proving actual harm might include proof of actual loss of
This could be
revenues along with proof of replicating use. 167
established by disproving other possible causes or relevant contextual
factors, such as the extent of the junior mark's exposure, similarity of the
168
senior and junior marks, and the firmness of the senior mark's hold.
In analyzing whether Ringling Brothers had suffered actual harm, the
Fourth Circuit placed great emphasis on survey data. 169 After examining

165 Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 458. The Fourth Circuit concluded that its stringent
interpretation of the FTDA requiring actual harm was a more narrow interpretation than
that of most courts and state anti-dilution claims. Id. at 459. Nevertheless, the Fourth
Circuit stated that it felt that this was the reading of the FTDA that was intended by
Congress. Id.
166 Id. at 449.
167 Id. at 465.
168 Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000). The Fourth Circuit commented that proof of actual
harm would be difficult because the concept of actual dilutive harm is a tricky notion.
Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 465. The court also held that a good way to prove actual harm
may be through the use of a consumer survey designed not just to demonstrate the "mental
association" in the public's mind, but also consumer reactions from which actual harm may
be implied. Id. The court stated that an effective survey should establish that the public
associates the trademark with both the senior and junior user, and also, that to some extent,
the senior user's utilization of the mark has been reduced. Id.
169 Id. at 462; Reichman, supra note 29, at 134. Ringling Brothers conducted a survey to
show that there was a mental association between its mark and Utah's advertisement
slogan. Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 462. The Ringling Brothers' survey was designed to
develop only this fact. Id. The survey was conducted by interviewing individuals at seven
shopping malls located throughout the country, including one in Utah. Id. A card was
randomly given to shoppers containing a fill-in-the-blank statement, which they were
asked to complete. Id. The card read: "The Greatest - on Earth." Id. If the shoppers
completed the statement they were then asked with whom or what they attributed the
statement. Id. They were also asked if they could think of any other way to complete the
statement. Id. The results showed that in Utah, twenty-five percent of the time the phrase
was completed with the word "show" and was related to the circus. Id. Twenty-four
percent of the time the statement was completed with the word "snow" and was associated
with Utah tourism. Id. Twenty-one percent of the respondents completed the statement
with both the words "show" and "snow" and associated the statement with the circus and
Utah, respectively. Id. Outside of Utah, forty-one percent of those surveyed completed the
statement with only the word "show" and associated the statement with the circus. Zero
percent completed the statement with only the word "snow" and related the phrase to
Utah. Id. In addition, fewer than one-half percent completed the statement with both
"show" and "snow" and related the respective phrases to the circus and Utah. Id.
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this information, however, the court determined that Utah's trademark
had absolutely no effect on the Ringling Brothers trademark.170
171
In contrast, the Second Circuit in Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc.
rejected the Fourth Circuit's actual harm criteria and adopted a
likelihood of dilution standard.1 72 The Nabisco court examined whether

Id. The district court concluded that the extensive survey evidence failed to show
actual dilution under the FTDA. Id. There were several reasons that the district court
failed to find actual dilution in favor of Ringling Brothers. Id. First, the court found that
the survey results were inadequate to meet the required "threshold mental association of
the marks." Id. This was due to the fact that some who took the survey filled in the blank
with both the words "show" and "snow." Id. The court reasoned that every customer that
filled in the blank with the word "show" related the phrase to the circus, whether they
were located inside or outside of Utah. Id. In addition, everyone surveyed who filled in
the word "snow," both inside and outside of Utah, associated the statement with Utah. Id.
Futhermore, not a single customer indicated that they associated the phrases "The Greatest
Show on Earth" with "The Greatest Snow on Earth." Id. In summary, the district court
reasoned that there was "strong evidence of the absence of dilution, not the presence of it."
Id. at 463. The court further reasoned that the survey results even failed to prove that the
use of Utah's mark had caused any lessening of the capacity of Ringling Brothers mark. Id.
The court specifically stated that the consumer familiarity with the Ringling Brothers mark
was greater in Utah (46%), the state where Utah's mark was well known, than in the
remaining states (41%) where Utah's mark was basically unheard of. Id. Furthermore,
every customer that was surveyed associated the Ringling Brothers' mark solely with the
circus and not with Utah's wintersports, snow, or winter activities. Id. Therefore, the
Fourth Circuit affirmed the finding of the district court that the consumer survey evidence
did not support a finding of dilution under the FTDA. Id.
171
191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999).
172
Id. at 223. Since 1962, Pepperidge Farm has produced small crackers resembling the
170

shape of a goldfish. Id. at 212. The Goldfish line of products includes numerous crackers in
various mixes and shapes; the primary product is the orange cheddar cheese-flavored, fishshaped cracker. Id. This cracker is sold in a bag or box, and it is advertised under the name
"Goldfish," with a picture of the cracker appearing on the front of the box. Id. Over the
years, Pepperidge Farm has acquired numerous trademark registrations for the Goldfish.
Id. Pepperidge Farm has also launched aggressive marketing campaigns to promote the
Goldfish product to children, who make up about half of its consumers. Id.Between 1995
and 1998, it spent more than $120 million dollars marketing the Goldfish line throughout
the United States and was substantially featured in the media. Id. at 213. Due to this, the
sales of Goldfish nearly doubled between 1995 and 1998 to $200 million per year. Id.
Goldfish crackers, ifmeasured by sales volume, are the second-largest selling cheese snack
cracker in the United States. Id. Based on sheer sales dollars, Goldfish is number one. Id.
In 1998, Nabisco was approached by Nickelodeon Television Network to promote the
Id. In August 1998,
"CatDog" cartoon for Nickelodeon's new cartoon program.
Nickelodeon gave Nabisco the right to produce a cheese cracker based on the CatDog
cartoon. Id. The CatDog product was intended to compete with other cheese flavored,
animal-shaped crackers aimed at children. Id. The main character in the CatDog cartoon is
a two-headed animal that is half cat and half dog. Id. Fish are the favorite food for the cat
half, and bones are the favorite food for the dog half. Id. In its first three months the
CatDog show was one of the most widely watched programs for children. Id. Subsequent
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the senior mark was distinctive and whether the junior user's use of the
mark diluted the distinctive quality. 173 The Second Circuit concluded
that the Nabisco mark was distinctive and famous and that the
competitiveness of the parties' products did not preclude a finding of
dilution. 174 The court also rejected the notion that to prove dilution there
must be a finding of actual harm, consummated harm, or proof of actual
revenue loss. 175

to its agreement with Nickelodeon, Nabisco began producing a cheese-flavored cracker
mix, which consisted of crackers shaped as the CatDog character, bone-shaped crackers,
and fish-shaped crackers. Id. The fish-shaped crackers consisted of 25% of the cracker mix
in the box. Id. The fish-shaped cracker bears a close resemblance to the Pepperidge Farm
cracker because it is similar in size, shape, color, and taste. Id. However, the CatDog
cracker is larger and flatter and has markings on one side. Id. Nabisco was expecting to
launch the CatDog cracker mix in February 1999, but on December 21, 1998, Pepperidge
Farm executives wrote to Nabisco protesting the cracker and requesting that Nabisco cease
and desist. Id. Subsequently, Nabisco filed a suit for declaratory judgment, and
Pepperidge Farm counterclaimed with infringement and dilution claims. Id.
173 Id. at 215. The court stated that it understood the FTDA to establish five elements for
a claim of dilution. Id. These elements are: (1) the senior mark must be famous; (2) it must
be distinctive; (3) the junior use must be a commercial use in commerce; (4) it must begin
after the senior mark has become famous; and (5) it must cause dilution of the distinctive
quality of the senior mark. Id. The Nabisco court only discussed the second and the fifth
elements. Id. The court acknowledged that distinctiveness is an important trademark
concept, which reflects a mark's inherent strengths and weaknesses. Id. Furthermore, the
more distinctive the mark, the more protection it deserves. Id. The FTDA clearly intended
distinctiveness to be an important element, and there can be no dilution of a mark's
distinctiveness unless the mark is distinctive to begin with. Id. at 216.
174 Id. at 219; Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 462; PAITISHALL, supra note 10, at 379. The court
observed that in certain cases the likelihood of dilution may be increased by product
proximity. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 219. The court stated that "a second major seller of
goldfish-shaped, orange-colored, cheddar-flavored, bite-sized crackers can hardly fail, in
our view, to dilute the distinctiveness in the eyes of many consumers of the senior mark in
a goldfish-shaped, orange-colored, cheddar-flavored, bite-sized cracker." Id. Additionally,
the court stated that "many consumers ...will find goldfish-shaped cheddar cheese
crackers served in a dish at a bar or restaurant or friend's house, looking very much like the
familiar Pepperidge Farm Goldfish product" and, therefore, the court recognized that
dilution can occur in a post-sale as well as a point-of-sale circumstance. Id. at 218.
175 Id. at 223. The Second Circuit stated that it did not agree with the Fourth Circuit's
interpretation of the statute. Id. The Second Circuit acknowledged that to require proof of
an actual loss of revenue was simply inappropriate. Id. The reasoning of the Second
Circuit was:
[lf the famous senior mark were being exploited with continually
growing success, the senior user might never be able to show
diminished revenues, no matter how obvious it was that the junior use
diluted the distinctiveness of the senior. Even if diminished revenue
could be shown, it would be extraordinarily speculative and difficult
to prove that the loss was due to the dilution of the mark. And as to
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The Second Circuit reasoned that Congress intended the FTDA to
provide for an injunction to prevent the harm before it occurs.176 The
Second Circuit reasoned further that to read the statute as the Ringling
Brothers court had would mean that the statute could not be invoked
until the actual injury had occurred. 7 Because the statute provided only
for an injunction and not damages, such an injury would never be
compensated.'78 Furthermore, the Nabisco court noted that if a famous
senior mark was being exploited with constant growing success, the
senior user may never be able to show decreased revenues, even though
it may be obvious that the junior user was diluting the distinctive quality
of the senior mark.1 79 Therefore, contrary to the Fourth Circuit's
decision, the Second Circuit held that only a likelihood of dilution was
necessary to successfully prove dilution.' 80

consumer surveys, they are expensive, time-consuming and not
immune to manipulation.
Id. at 223-24. The court analogized that if a junior user began marketing Buick aspirin or
Schlitz shellac, it saw no reason why the senior user could not simply rely on some
persuasive "circumstantial evidence of dilution" of the distinctiveness of their marks
without having to show lost revenue or expensive surveys. Id. at 224. In addition, the
court held that circumstantial evidence is used to prove infringement and that there is no
reason why it cannot be used to prove dilution. Id.
176
Id.
177 Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2) (2000). The Second Circuit also reasoned that the Fourth
Circuit's actual harm reading of the statute was dangerous for the junior user. Nabisco, 191
F.3d at 224. The junior user could be harmed because it would be unable to know if it
could use a certain mark until after the mark had been marketed. Id. The court stated that
this was why Nabisco sought to get declaratory relief as soon as possible. Id. The Second
Circuit acknowledged:
[I]f the statute is interpreted to mean that no adjudication can be made
until the junior mark has been launched and has caused actual
dilution, businesses in Nabisco's position will be unable to seek
declaratory relief before going to market. They will be obligated to
spend the huge sums involved in a product launch without the ability
to seek prior assurance that their mark will not be enjoined.
Id.
178 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2); Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 224. The Second Circuit stated that it was
not sure if the Ringling Brothers opinion intended to limit the application of the statute to
dilution that has actually occurred, even though it seemed reasonable that the Fourth
Circuit had limited dilution claims to only cases of actual dilution. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 224.
In any event, the Second Circuit declared that proof of a likelihood of dilution was all that
was required under the FTDA. Id. at 225.
179 Id. at 224.
18o Id. at 224-25. The Second Circuit specifically stated that "in any event, we read the
statute to permit adjudication granting or denying an injunction, whether at the instance of
the senior user or the junior user seeking declaratory relief, before the dilution has actually
occurred." Id.; Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1031 (2d
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Despite the Second Circuit's interpretation of the FTDA, the Fifth
Circuit, in Westchester Media v. PRL USA, 181 chose to follow the Fourth
Circuit and adopt the "actual harm" standard. 182 The Fifth Circuit
reasoned that the FTDA requires proof of actual harm because this is the
183
standard that is more closely related to the intent of the FTDA.

Cir. 1989). The Second Circuit also rejected the district court's application of the Mead Data
test. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 227. The court reasoned that the Mead Data test failed to include a
number of factors that it believed to be important. Id. Namely, the Mead Data test did not
include "actual confusion and likelihood of confusion, shared consumers and geographic
isolation, the adjectival quality of the junior use, and the interrelated factors of duration of
the junior use, harm to the junior user, and delay by the senior in bringing the action." Id.
at 228. The court also stated that future fact patterns will most likely suggest additional
factors to be considered, so, therefore, its list was not exhaustive. Id. Ultimately, the
Second Circuit adopted a ten-factor test for dilution, known as the Nabisco test. Id. at 21722. The ten factors included in the test are: (1) distinctiveness; (2) similarity of the marks;
(3) proximity of the products and likelihood of bridging the gap; (4) interrelationship
among the distinctiveness of the senior mark, the similarity of the junior mark, and the
proximity of the products; (5) shared consumers and geographic limitations; (6)
sophistication of the consumers; (7) actual confusion; (8) adjectival or referential quality of
the junior use; (9) harm to the junior user and delay by the senior user; and (10) effect of
senior's prior laxity in protecting the mark. Id. The court concluded that there was a "high
likelihood of success" in proving that Nabisco's use of its goldfish shape would dilute the
distinctiveness of Pepperidge Farm's almost identical well-known senior mark. Id. at 222.
181
214 F.3d 658 (5th Cir. 2000).
182
Id. at 671.
183
Id. Polo Ralph Lauren ("PRL") is a business dealing with fashion and design and was
founded in 1967 by Ralph Lauren. Id. at 661. PRL has been built into a huge multi-billion
dollar company that encompasses the selling of wearing apparel, accessories, home
furnishings, and fragrances. Id. In the last four years, PRL has sold about four billion
dollars in products that bear the POLO trademark. Id. PRL extensively advertises in
mediums such as newspapers and magazines. Id. Articles appear not only about PRL's
products but also about the designer, Ralph Lauren himself. Id. For instance, articles about
Ralph Lauren have been published in magazines as diverse as Time, FinancialWorld, Town
& Country, and Vanity Fair. Id. In addition, PRL has registered several trademarks with the
Patent and Trademark Office, which include the word POLO. Id. All of the POLO
trademarks are currently in effect and all have gained incontestability under 15 U.S.C. §
1065 (2000). Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 661. PRL claims that since it has successfully
used the POLO logo for over thirty years, the word POLO has "come to be closely
identified with both Ralph Lauren and PRL." Id.
Westchester Media is the publisher of several specialty magazines, and until the
summer of 1997, it only produced specialty magazines like Cowboys & Indians. Id.
Furthermore, the owner of Westchester Media has been a member of the United States Polo
Association since 1989 and has also served on several committee boards. Id. He was on the
Board of Directors for the Houston Polo Club and served as director in 1994 and 1995. Id.
In the spring of 1997, Westchester Media and Navasota Holding Company bought the
assets of POLO magazine, including its trademarks, from Fleet Street Publishing Company
and its owner, Ami Shinitzky. Id. The trademark registration was granted to Shinitzky in
1992 and read as follows:
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Moreover, the court stated that there was a key difference between the
state anti-dilution statutes that preceded the FTDA and the FTDA
itself.184 In brief, the state anti-dilution statutes expressly incorporated
85
the likelihood of the dilution standard while the FTDA did not.

(1) Registration No. 1,691,432 for "POLO", a "magazine on the subject
of equestrian sports and lifestyles"; (2) Registration No. 1,677,088 for a
"horse and rider design" for "magazine publication services", and the
design which appears on the masthead of POLO magazine; and (3)
Registration No. 1,710,894 for "POLO Life", a "magazine dealing with
equestrian sports and lifestyles."
Id.
Shinitzky's POLO magazine was founded in 1975 and was a special interest magazine
until the magazine was sold in 1997. Id. Shinitzky even offered to sell the magazine in
1994 to PRL, but received no response. Id. at 662. In April, the federal registration that
Shinitzky had received became incontestable. Id. In May 1997, Westchester Media bought
all of the assets of POLO magazine for about $400,000. Id. The old POLO magazine was
not a very profitable venture and it lost $1,400 in 1996. Id. Westchester Media explained its
interest by stating that it was interested in the goodwill and history behind Fleet Street's
POLO mark and the access the magazine provided to those interested in polo. Id.
Westchester Media claimed that it intended to "relaunch" the magazine, and at no time did
it attempt during the purchase negotiations to link the magazine with "Ralph Lauren's
spectacular achievement with the name Polo." Id. In October 1997, Westchester Media relaunched the magazine under the name POLO and also published a separate magazine
Id. The new POLO magazine carried the tagline
called "Polo Players Edition."
"Adventure. Elegance. Sport." Id. In addition, the magazine also changed its target
audience when Westchester Media purchased the customer list from Nieman Marcus, one
of PRL's largest retailers. Id. Westchester Media also arranged to mail new promotional
materials to these customers. Id. Westchester Media then sent a free copy of the magazine
to almost one million Nieman Marcus customers and marketed the magazine as not about
the sport but about an "adventurous approach to living life." Id. Westchester Media also
chose fashion model Claudia Schiffer to appear on its inaugural cover; only one year
before, Schiffer had appeared as a model in an extensive PRL's advertising campaign. Id.
On September 23, 1997, PRL formally objected to the title of the new POLO magazine, and,
in response, Westchester Media filed this action, seeking a declaration that its use of POLO
did not infringe PRL's POLO trademark. Id. at 662. PRL asserted counterclaims for
trademark infringement, dilution, and unfair competition under the Lanham Act and Texas
law and sought injunctive relief. Id.
184 Id.

185 Id. The court articulated that the actual harm standard was the criterion intended by
Congress when passing the FTDA because both the present tense of the verb and the lack
of any modification of "dilution" supported an actual harm standard. Id. at 671. Several
times the Fifth Circuit has come across FTDA claims and has either declined to rule on
them or has avoided an analysis of the act. See Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. W. Bend Co., 123
F.3d 246, 261 n.28 (5th Cir. 1997); Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece, 950 F. Supp. 783, 797
(S.D. Tex. 1996). The Westchester Media court also noted that, "unlike the state antidilution
statutes which provide only injunctive relief, reflecting their sole focus on the prevention of
future harm, the federal Act provides that where willful conduct is shown, compensatory
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The court reasoned that absent unambiguous legislative history
indicating that Congress intended a likelihood of dilution standard, the
court should not depart from the actual harm standard embodied in the
language of the statute. 18 6 Furthermore, under this standard, the court
187
found no dilution because there was no actual harm.
Similarly, in Eli Lilly Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc.,188 the Seventh
Circuit affirmed an order of the district court enjoining the defendant's
use of HERBROZAC because the term was likely to dilute the plaintiff's
PROZAC trademark. 189 The district court held that Eli Lilly ("Lilly") was
not required to demonstrate actual dilution.190 On appeal, the Seventh
Circuit affirmed this analysis and stated that the likelihood of dilution
standard applied by the district court was correct.1 91

and restitutionary relief may be awarded -for necessarily consummated economic harm."
214 F.3d at 671.
186 Id. The court held that the Nabisco opinion asserted that an actual harm standard
allowed excessive literalism and, therefore, clouded and defeated the true intent of the
statute. See generally Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999). However,
this court held that the most consistent reading of the statute to Congress' intent is through
the plain meaning of the statute, which is actual harm. Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 671.
187 Id.
188 233 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 2000).
189
Id. at 480. Natural Answers develops, markets, and sells a line of herbal dietary
supplements, which are marketed as Herbscriptions. Id. at 459. Herbscriptions are
promoted as drug alternatives and include such products as HerbenolPM, HERBALIUM,
HERBASPIRIN, and HERBADRYL. Id. The founder of Natural Answers testified that each
name was picked to call to mind the function of the famous drug from which its name
came. Id. Natural Answers markets its product line solely through its Internet website;
however, it eventually has plans to open retail outlets. Id. At one point, the website
contained a source code which included the term PROZAC as a metatag and also described
HERBROZAC as a powerful alternative to PROZAC. Id. In response to this lawsuit,
Before Natural Answers could get
Id.
Natural Answers removed the metatag.
HERBROZAC off the ground, Eli Lilly ("Lilly") sued to enjoin the use of that name,
claiming infringement, dilution, and a violation under Indiana's unfair competition law.
Id. at 461. The district court held that Lilly would likely succeed at trial against Natural
Answers. Id. The court held that customers would likely confuse HERBROZAC with the
famous PROZAC drug manufactured by Lilly. Id.
190 Id. The district court enjoined Natural Answers from further use of the term
"PROZAC" and ordered any references to the term removed from the Natural Answers
website. Id. At the time Lilly filed this lawsuit, Natural Answers had only sold two
thousand dollars worth of product. Id.
191
Id. at 465. The Seventh Circuit disagreed with the district court on one main point. Id.
The Seventh Circuit held that evidence of actual confusion may not indicate likelihood of
confusion. Id. Therefore, it determined that actual confusion is not necessary to find
likelihood of dilution. Id. The Seventh Circuit concluded that two facts pointed to the
conclusion that Natural Answers intended to cause consumer confusion. Id. First, Natural
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The Seventh Circuit agreed with the district court that the record
contained no evidence of actual confusion and confirmed that Lilly was
not required to produce such evidence to prove dilution. 192 The court
agreed with the Second Circuit that forcing senior users to prove actual
dilution would subject senior users to uncompensable injury and would
hold them to an impossible level of proof. 193 The court noted that the
likelihood of dilution standard was acceptable because irreparable harm
is generally presumed in cases of trademark infringement and
dilution. 94 Therefore, the Seventh Circuit followed the logic of the
Second Circuit when it held that PROZAC was a famous mark and

Answers admitted that it intended to confuse consumers and that most likely the name
HERBROZAC would remind customers of PROZAC. Id. Second, Natural Answers had
wrongful intent as proven through its references to PROZAC on its website, clearly meant
to divert customers who were searching for PROZAC to find HERBROZAC information.
Id.
192 Id. at 464.
The district court realized that only two thousand dollars worth of
HERBROZAC had been sold; therefore, it was not surprising that Eli Lilly could not
identify consumers who had been confused. Id. The Seventh Circuit, agreeing with the
district court, further reasoned that due to the low level of sales, consumer survey
evidence, to be statistically reliable, would require a greater sampling than available. Id.
The court did state that one factor weighed in favor of Natural Answers-the fact that it
was unlikely that HERBROZAC and PROZAC would be used concurrently. Id. at 463.
This is because a doctor must prescribe PROZAC, and there is little doubt that a doctor
would have trouble telling the difference between PROZAC and HERBROZAC. Id.
193 Id, at 468. The Seventh Circuit noted that senior users would be injured, and the only
remedy would be an injunction, which can be insufficient, unless the defendant acted
willfully, then damages would be permitted. Id. If the "causes dilution" element requires a
proof of actual economic harm, senior mark holders would be restrained from bringing a
lawsuit before injury; thus, the FTDA would not compensate them for many injuries. Id. In
addition, the court noted that when you have an immensely successful drug like PROZAC,
it is possible that the distinctiveness of the PROZAC trademark could be diluted even if
sales are increasing. Id. The fact to consider is that sales may not be increasing as much as
would have been possible if it were not for the diluting mark. Id. The court went on to
note that even if diminished revenue could be shown, it would be extremely difficult to
prove that the loss occurred as a result of dilution. Id. Customer surveys are expensive,
time consuming, and can also be tampered with. Id. Dilution of a mark may not even be
able to be shown on an empirical basis. Id. Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit considered
the two factors that the district court did to find dilution-the similarity between
HERBROZAC and PROZAC and the renown of the PROZAC trademark. Id. at 469. The
court established that the two marks were highly similar. Id. They also held that PROZAC
was a highly renown mark that has received an immense amount of coverage from the
news media. Id. The court illustrated that PROZAC is "a designer label, a buzzword, a
brand name familiar to ...Americans who have taken it, but also [to] those who wonder if
they too, might find a cure for whatever ails them in the little green-and-off-white capsule."
Id. Therefore, PROZAC had achieved huge fame in the American culture and dilution
could be proven. Id.
194
Id.
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determined that Lilly had tendered enough evidence to meet the
19 5
likelihood of dilution standard.
Most recently, in V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 196 the Sixth
Circuit followed the Second and Seventh Circuits in holding that
likelihood of dilution is the proper standard for analyzing a dilution
claim. 197 The Sixth Circuit stated that the Second Circuit's likelihood of
dilution test is the standard most closely aligned with both the language
and intent of the FTDA.198 The court concluded that when the FTDA
was enacted, the legislators were attempting to ensure that a plaintiff
would have a nationwide remedy for dilution. 199
The Sixth Circuit held that proving actual harm would be extremely
difficult because harm may not have occurred and that proving actual
200
harm through survey evidence would be unreasonably burdensome.
The key factor in the decision was whether a consumer would link a
store called "Victor's Little Secret," which sold women's lingerie, with

195 Id. Given the evidence the court was presented with, it held that PROZAC had
achieved extraordinary fame in American culture. Id. Since its beginning in 1988,
PROZAC has received considerable media attention. Id. at 459. Twice PROZAC appeared
on the cover of Newsweek, and, in 1999, Fortune magazine named it one of the top six
"health and grooming" products of the twentieth century. Id. Over two hundred and forty
million PROZAC prescriptions have been written for seventeen million Americans,
generating sales over twelve million dollars. Id.
196 259 F.3d 464 (6th Cir. 2001).
197 Id.; Eli Lilly, 233 F.3d at 456; Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 224 (2d Cir.
1999). Victoria's Secret operates over seven hundred and fifty stores nationwide and
distributes four hundred million copies of its catalogue each year. V Secret, 259 F.3d at 466.
Victoria's Secret also sells products over the Internet. Id. Defendants opened "Victor's
Secret," a store in a strip mall in Kentucky, and they sold a variety of products ranging
from lingerie to adult videos, sex toys, and adult novelties. Id. The Moseleys received a
cease and desist letter from Victoria's Secret, and they then changed their store's name to
"Victor's Little Secret." Id. at 467. As a result, this litigation ensued. Id.
198 Id. at 475. The court applied the Second Circuit's reasoning to the facts and held that
the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Victoria's Secret on the
trademark dilution claim. Id.
199 Id. The congressional record indicates that dilution is "an injury that differs materially
from that arising out of the orthodox confusion. Even in the absence of confusion, the
potency of a mark may be debilitated by another's use. This is the essence of dilution." Id.
200 Id. at 476. Even the Second Circuit concedes that requiring proof of actual dilution
through survey evidence would make bringing a successful dilution claim under the FTDA
extremely difficult. Id. The Sixth Circuit stated that it found it very unlikely that Congress
would have intended to fashion such a broad remedy and then would have made its proof
effectively impossible. Id.
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the influential and famous "Victoria's Secret." 201 The court expressed
little doubt that the average lingerie shopper would make such an
202
association.
Recently, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and
heard the Victoria's Secret case. 203 In an overly narrow opinion that
exercised unparalleled judicial restraint, the Supreme Court vaguely
2 °4
In
held that actual proof of dilution was the correct standard to apply.
addition, the Court gave no indication of what proof was needed to
successfully prove actual dilution; as a result, this holding simply added
205
to the confusion that has plagued the dilution concept.
Is actual dilution or a likelihood of dilution the correct standard to
assess whether dilution has occurred? Is it reasonably equitable to force
parties to prove dilution through empirical evidence, like surveys? Is it
wise to make parties only prove a likelihood of dilution? Part III of this
Note will analyze the weaknesses of the two approaches to proving
trademark dilution, detail the favorable underlying principles behind the

201 Id. at 477. It is likely, the court held, that a consumer would go into the Moseleys'
adult store and hear the name "Victor's Little Secret" and link it to Victoria's Secret,
thereby diluting Victoria's Secret through tarnishment and blurring. Id.
202
Id. To prove that an association would be made between "Victor's Little Secret" and
Victoria's Secret, the court applied the ten-factor approach to dilution that the Second
Circuit had utilized. Id. at 476. These factors are:
distinctiveness; similarity of the marks; proximity of the products and
the likelihood of bridging the gap; interrelationship among the
distinctiveness of the senior mark, the similarity of the junior mark,
and the proximity of the products; shared consumers and geographic
limitations; sophistication of consumers; actual confusion; adjectival or
referential quality of the junior use; harm to the junior user and delay
by the senior user; and the effect of the senior's prior laxity in
protecting the mark.
Id. The court held the Victoria's Secret mark was quite distinctive, thus, deserving of a high
degree of trademark protection. Id. The court noted that most importantly the two marks
in question were "highly similar" and there could be no contesting the fact that the marks
are almost semantically identical. Id. at 477. The court also held that based on the
trademark layout, the marks were also graphically similar. Id.
203
Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 123 S.Ct. 1115 (2003).
204
Id. at 1124.
205
Id. The Supreme Court stated that to prove actual dilution, actual loss of sales or
profits do not have to be proven. Id. The Court also noted that consumer surveys and
other means of showing actual dilution are oftentimes expensive and unreliable. Id.
Thereby, the Supreme Court disagreed with the Fourth Circuit's holding that these means
were necessary to prove actual dilution. Id. at 1125.
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likelihood of dilution theory, and discuss why the Supreme Court
20 6
should have correctly embraced this method.
III.

CHOOSING THE CORRECT STANDARD

A careful examination of the standards used by courts to prove
trademark dilution reveals that both standards are flawed. Furthermore,
the actual dilution standard has too many faults, which renders it
unworkable. Therefore, the likelihood of dilution standard, while not
perfect, is the appropriate method that the Supreme Court should have
chosen. Part III.A notes the flaws in the actual dilution standard. 2 7 Part
III.B exposes the criticisms that surround the likelihood of dilution
standard. 208 Finally, Part III.C discusses the rationale as to why the
likelihood of dilution standard is the best method to apply to dilution
209
claims.
A.

The Weaknesses of the Actual Economic Harm Standard

Inherent weaknesses make the actual harm test unsuitable for
evaluating dilution claims. 210 The Fourth Circuit noted in Ringling
Brothers that a cause of action is not available for the senior user until
some type of quantifiable harm has been done to the senior user's
trademark. 211 Under the actual harm standard, a lawsuit cannot arise
212
until a trademark has been significantly blurred or tarnished.
However, at that time it is too late because the damage is already
complete in the minds of the consumers, and the senior user is offered
213
little relief.

206
207
208

See infra Part III.
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.B.

209 See infra Part III.C.; see also Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 224 (2d Cir.
1999).
210 See Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Prop. Law Professors et al. at 5, Moseley v. V
Secret Catalogue, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 1115 (2003) (No. 01-1015).
211 See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel
Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 464 (4th Cir. 1999).
212

PA"TISHALL, supra note 10, at 379

Id.; Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Prop. Law Professors et al. at 5. The Nabisco
court also found the Fourth Circuit's reliance on the statutory "causes dilution" language to
be "excessive literalism." 191 F.3d at 224. The court stated that an actual dilution
interpretation would subject the senior user to uncompensable injury because until injury
had occurred, the statute could not be invoked. Id.
213
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The actual dilution approach has two main faults. 214 First, it
obligates the defendant to be established in the commercial marketplace
before a cause of action can be brought. 215 For example, a company that
announces its intention to sell Kodak pianos nationwide must be allowed
to do so, even if all the parties involved agree that the use will dilute the
famous Kodak mark. 216 This approach is not beneficial since the harm
has already occurred to the mark when the senior user is first permitted
217
to sue under the FTDA.
Second, under the actual harm test, trademarks cannot be protected
until they have lost their value. 218
This is illogical because the
trademark's value is exactly what the FTDA aims to protect 219 Once the
actual value of a trademark is lost, it cannot be regained: consumers will
have already associated the two marks and blurring or tarnishment will
have occurred. 220 This consumer association according to the definition
of actual harm is necessary for dilution to occur. 221 Most likely the

Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Prop. Law Professors et al. at 5. It should be noted
that the United States Supreme Court refused to limit the Copyright Act's Fair Use
provision to require that one prove actual harm. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984). The Court stated that to show such harm would
leave the copyright holder without a defense against damage, which can be predicted. Id.
The Court also noted that it is not necessary to show with any degree of certainty that
future harm could result. Id. The only requirement the Court imposed upon the copyright
holder to show was by a preponderance of the evidence that some meaningful likelihood of
future harm existed. Id. To demand proof of actual harm as a predicate for proving
dilution goes against the logic of the FTDA. Brief of Amicus Curiae Int'l Trademark Ass'n
et al. at 19, Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 1115 (2003) (No. 01-1015).
215 Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Prop. Law Professors et al. at 5. Only after the
piano company's use actually weakens Kodak's mark will Kodak be permitted to sue
under the FTDA. Id. There is nothing to be gained by such an approach. Id. at 5-6.
216 Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Prop. Law Professors et al. at 5.
217 Id. at 6; PATMSHALL, supra note 10, at 379.
218
Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 224.
219 Id.; Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Prop. Law Professors et al. at 6. Actual harm is
a strange reading of the statute and is problematic regarding dilution. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at
224. Once the value of the trademark is lost, it cannot be regained. Id.
220 Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Prop. Law Professors et al. at 6. Once consumers
blur the significance in their minds, it is nearly impossible to imagine how a court could
issue an order to de-blur or de-tarnish the mark in the consumers mind. Id. It could also be
possible that no amount of work could restore the trademark to its position before dilution.
Id.
221 PATISHALL, supra note 10, at 379.
214
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damage cannot be undone: how can a court erase from the minds of
consumers the association between two marks?'
As noted, the actual harm standard requires that actual harm occur
before legal action can ensue.2 3 However, under the FTDA this harm
can never be remedied, because the statute only provides injunctive
relief. 224 Moreover, evidence of actual injury is not the standard that
courts use when granting an injunction. 225 To grant an injunction,
federal courts require irreparable harm and inadequacy of legal
remedies. 226 Therefore, in the vast majority of cases, the only satisfaction
a trademark owner can obtain is an ability to stop future dilution: under
the FTDA nothing can be done to remedy the harm that has already
occurred. 227 It seems unlikely that Congress would require actual harm
and then refuse to compensate the injured party once it was
established. 22s

222 Id. It is likely that the damage cannot be reversed by a court order because the
damage is in the minds of the consumers. Id.
=
Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev.,
170 F.3d 449, 464 (4th Cir. 1999); Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Prop. Law Professors et
al. at 6-7.
224 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2) (2000). In most cases an injunction is the only relief possible
under the FTDA. Id. However, where the injured party can prove willful intent, damages
are a possible remedy. Id. The FTDA reads that "the owner of the famous mark shall be
entitled only to injunctive relief unless the person against whom the injunction is sought
willfully intended to trade on the owner's reputation or to cause dilution of the famous
mark." Id. Then, in these limited circumstances, monetary relief may be given, and the
court has the discretion to destroy the infringing articles. Id.
225 Brief of Amicus Curiae Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass'n et al. at 2; Moseley v. V
Secret Catalogue, Inc., 123 S.Ct. 1115 (2003) (No. 01-1015). Requiring proof of actual harm
by a single person also ignores the fact that there may be numerous third-party dilutive
uses. Id. The FTDA was enacted to prevent the "gradual whittling away" of a mark's
distinctiveness. Id. "Settled principles of equity, as embodied in the Trademark Act, do not
require a showing of actual harm for the granting of injunctive relief." Id.
226 See infra note 257 and accompanying text.
227 Brief of Amicus Curiae Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass'n et al. at 2.
m Id. This reading of the FTDA would render the FTDA "hollow" and would strain the
equitable power of the numerous courts. Id. Injunctive relief is designed to prevent harm,
not to attempt to undue a harm once it has been committed. Swift & Co. v. United States,
276 U.S. 311, 326 (1928); Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Prop. Law Professors et al. at 7.
"The proposal requirement of actual economic harm would turn this principle on its head,
precluding injunctions designed to stop dilution and permitting only injunctions designed
to 'close the barn door' long after the horse is gone." Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual
Prop. Law Professors et al. at 8. The requirement of actual harm does not leap immediately
from the text of the FTDA; the International Trademark Association stated that:
[I]n finding that such a requirement [actual harm] is dictated by the
history of dilution theory, the Fourth Circuit is in error. While it might
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The actual harm standard imposes numerous unreasonably high
evidentiary hurdles that are not required by the FTDA. 229 For example,
the actual harm standard is extremely difficult to prove. 230 Courts have
had repeated difficulty in quantifying the factors, such as fame, when
calculating the distinctiveness of a mark. 231 The reduction of a
trademark's distinctiveness by a junior user will be even more
burdensome on the senior user. 232 Even the Unfair Competition
Restatement concedes that dilution proof must rely on inferences

have been radical in 1927 to define dilution as a "mental association"
that attacks a senior mark's "distinctiveness," the law has evolved
from Yale Electric to Mishawaka to James Burrough to Abercombie to
Allied Maintenance to U.S. Olympic Committee. Requiring proof of
actual harm for a concept that was conceived to free famous marks
from the shackles of "concrete injury" would be the ultimate
oxymoron. Rather, history teaches, and this Court has recognized, that
a substantial mental association with a junior use suffices, without
more, to "lessen the distinctiveness and thus the commercial value" of
a qualifying symbol.
Brief of Amicus Curiae Int'l Trademark Ass'n et al. at 19 (citations omitted). Legislative
intent can be derived from the remedial scheme that was adopted by Congress. Id. at 22.
Congress created a special damage provision in recognition of the difficulty in proving
actual damage by a defendant's conduct, for infringement cases. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117.
However, with respect to dilution, unless it is intentional, only an injunction can be sought
as a remedy, thus implying that actual harm from a "single bee sting" is simply difficult to
prove and nonexistent. Brief of Amicus Curiae Int'l Trademark Ass'n et al. at 22.
229 Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 224 (2d Cir. 1999); Brief of Amici Curiae
Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass'n et al. at 6. The interpretation of the FTDA to require
actual harm would frustrate the intent of the statute. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 224. The majority
of federal circuits have rejected that approach because it is "virtually impossible to prove."
Id. Even the circuits that have used the actual harm standard have acknowledged the
extreme difficulty in proving actual harm. Id.; Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined
Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 464 (4th Cir. 1999); Westchester
Media v. PRL USA, 214 F.3d 658, 670 (5th Cir. 2000). In Ringling Brothers, the court
suggested three types of evidence that could meet the actual harm standard under the
FTDA: (1) lost revenues; (2) consumer surveys; and (3) indirect evidence of relevant
contextual factors. 170 F.3d at 464. "Upon a closer examination, neither the first nor
second of these types of evidence reliably demonstrates the prohibited dilution. The third
option is indistinguishable from evidence offered under the 'likelihood of dilution'
standard." Brief of Amicus Curiae Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass'n et al. at 7.
2mO V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464, 476 (6th Cir. 2001) (stating that even
the Fourth Circuit concedes that requiring the proof of actual dilution will be very
difficult).
231
Id.
232
Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Prop. Law Professors et al. at 8.
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because direct evidence of a dilution of distinctiveness is typically not
233
available.
The Ringling Brothers court stated that surveys could be used to show
actual damages. 234 However, a survey may not be helpful.235 Several
impediments exist to proving actual harm through survey evidence, and
the Supreme Court has blatantly stated that surveys are not necessary to
prove actual dilution. 236 Also, it may be difficult to design a survey that
can show dilution, because dilution is a concept that is difficult to
quantify. 237 In addition, dilution concepts like blurring or tarnishment

233

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25 (1995).

Another problem with

actual dilution is its circular approach:
One of the factors bearing on fame is the number of competing uses of
a mark; a mark is more likely to be famous if it is unique than if many
different companies share the same mark. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)(G)
(2000) (use of a mark by third parties one factor relevant to fame); 4
MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION at § 24:92, at 24173 ("A mark that is merely one in a crowd of similar marks will not
usually be famous."). Under the actual dilution approach, a trademark
owner with a unique, famous mark must permit other uses of its mark
until it can show that the distinctiveness of its own mark has been
blurred. But by then, the mark may not count as famous, both because
it is no longer unique and because its distinctive significance has been
whittled away. The result is a vicious circle for trademark owners.
Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Prop. Law Professors, et al. at 8 n.3; see supra note 85.
234 Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 462, 465 (stating that a survey can be skillfully constructed
to not just show the mental association of the marks in isolation but to also further
consumer impressions from which actual harm and cause might rationally be inferred).
235
Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Prop. Law Professors et al. at 9.
236 V Secret, 537 U.S. 418, 427 (2003). The Supreme Court has held that to prove actual
dilution survey evidence is not a necessary means. Id. However, the Supreme Court
offered no other viable option to prove actual dilution. Id.; Brief of Amicus Curiae
Intellectual Prop. Law Professors et al. at 9; PATTISHALL, supra note 10, at 384 (stating that
proof will be difficult because actual consummated dilutive harm and its cause are difficult
concepts). The Seventh Circuit doubts whether dilution of the distinctiveness of the mark
can be proven on an empirical basis by even a carefully constructed survey. Eli Lilly Co. v.
Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 468 (7th Cir. 2000). In addition, consumer surveys can
be expensive, time consuming, and susceptible to manipulation. Nabisco, Inc. v. PF
Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 224 (2d Cir. 1999). The Intellectual Property Law Association has
stated that "[ilt is all but impossible to compare by survey methodology the selling power
of a famous mark before a defendant's dilutive use begins with the diminished selling
power of a famous mark after the dilutive use began." Brief of Amicus Curiae Am.
Intellectual Prop. Law Ass'n et al. at 8. Even if this was a possibility, famous mark owners
would then be obligated to constantly survey consumer perception of their marks in
anticipation of dilution litigation, this is an impractical burden that would only drive up
the cost of owning and maintaining a famous trademark. Id.
237 See supra note 230. The Restatement notes that blurring is a concept that is not easily
captured in consumer surveys. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25.
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are even more difficult to show through survey evidence. 238 Requiring a
showing of actual harm through survey evidence would ensure that very
few injured parties could get relief. 239 Thus, given the several major
problems inherent in adopting the actual harm standard, we turn to the
likelihood of dilution standard. 240
B.

Problems Surrounding the Likelihood of Dilution Standard

The likelihood of dilution standard is not perfect. 241 First, the test
does not incorporate the language of the FTDA because the likelihood of
dilution method only prohibits acts that "cause dilution." 242 Next, the
FTDA does not include contextual language suggesting that Congress

23M Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Prop. Law Professors et al. at 9. Blurring and
tarnishment are concepts that are difficult to quantify:
Demonstrating that a mark is being blurred requires a time
comparison: the trademark owner must show that the mark is less
distinctive now than it was before the blurring. But how can a
consumer survey go back in time to make that comparison? Will
trademark owners have to constantly survey their consumers, testing
the fame of their marks and casting about for someone to sue
whenever that fame declines? The difficulties inherent in proving such
harm will be unable to take advantage of the anemic remedies the
actual dilution approach would permit.
Id.
239
Id.
240
Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 224; Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Prop. Law Professors et al.
at 10. Another problem with the actual harm standard occurs when more than one party
dilutes the senior user's mark. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 224. Under the actual dilution
approach, one can only get injunctive relief if the injured party can prove that a particular
use caused the harm to the mark. Id. The problem here is that this assumes that a single
defendant caused the harm. Id. However, if numerous parties dilute a mark the trademark
owner must prove that it has been harmed, and it may be impossible to demonstrate that
any one of those uses was the actual cause of the harm. Id. As Frank Schechter stated,
dilution is the "whittling away" of a mark's distinctiveness; it is not harm caused by a
single defendant, but rather harm caused by multiple defendants. Id. It would be very
strange if the FTDA was interpreted to exclude the typical case of dilution, as implied by
the actual harm standard. Id. Whatever standard is chosen to be correct must be the
uniform standard for all federal courts. Brief of Amicus Curiae Int'l Trademark Ass'n et al.
at 22. An uncertainty has and will continue to be created as to which standard applies;
therefore, the standard chosen should be uniform for all the federal courts. Id.
241 Kilm, supra note 115, at 752; see also Klieger, supra note 50, at 840 (asserting that the
FTDA's language requires a proof of actual dilution-the junior use of a mark must
actually be shown to dilute the senior mark before it can be enjoined).
242 Kim, supra note 115, at 752 (stating that when Congress passed the FTDA, it was well
aware that twenty-five states had anti-dilution laws that provided relief if a defendant's
mark was likely to dilute another's trademark). Congress surely had this knowledge when
drafting the FTDA, yet it did not adopt the words "likely" when the FTDA was created. Id.
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intended a likelihood of dilution standard. 243 Moreover, critics claim that
the likelihood of dilution standard is merely a creation of state law and
should have no bearing on the FTDA because state anti-dilution statutes
typically require a showing of a likelihood of dilution. 244 Finally, actual
harm advocates claim that the likelihood of dilution standard emerged
from a Second Circuit case in which the court confused infringement
with dilution. 245 Nevertheless, the likelihood of dilution standard is
246
preferable to the actual harm standard.
C. Likelihood of Dilution as Arguably the Best Standard
There are several reasons why the likelihood of dilution standard is
the proper method that the Supreme Court should have applied. 247 First,
Congress clearly intended the owners of famous trademarks to be able to
stop possible diluting acts before they were harmed.24" This clarity is

Kim, supra note 115, at 753; Klieger, supra note 50, at 840. The FTDA did not adopt
language like: "future capacity," "will lessen," "may lessen," "could cause dilution," "may
cause dilution," "will cause dilution," or "likely to cause dilution." Kim, supra note 115, at
753. However, in contrast:
The court [in Nabisco] also found the Fourth Circuit's reliance on the
statutory "causes dilution" language to be "excessive literalism." That
interpretation often would subject the senior user to uncompensable
injury, according to the court, because the statute could not be invoked
until injury had already occurred, and the statute provides only for an
injunction and no damages (absent willfulness).
PArrISHALL, supra note 10, at 379; see Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 224; Ringling Bros.-Barnum &
Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 461 (4th Cir. 1999);
Kim, supra note 115, at 753 (stating that it is strange to interpret the FTDA as requiring only
a likelihood of dilution when Congress deliberately refused to use such language; despite
the fact that state models could act as templates for the FTDA, Congress chose to divert
from these). The plain meaning of the FTDA was intended to provide for a showing of
actual economic harm to prove dilution. Id.
244 Mathew S. Voss, Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah
Division of Travel Development & Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
265,277(2000).
245
Kim, supra note 115, at 760 (stating that consumer confusion does not occur with
dilution; thus, the court confused dilution with infringement); see supra note 73.
246 See generally Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Prop. Law Professors et al. at 10; Brief
of Amicus Curiae Int'l Trademark Ass'n et al. at 18; Brief of Amicus Curiae Am. Intellectual
Prop. Law Ass'n et al. at 8.
247 Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Prop. Law Professors et al. at 10; Brief of Amicus
Curiae Int'l Trademark Ass'n et al. at 18; Brief of Amicus Curiae Am. Intellectual Prop. Law
Ass'n et al. at 8.
248 PATYISHALL, supra note 10, at 379.
The [Nabisco] Court further opined that the Fourth Circuit's
interpretation of the statute would be disadvantageous to junior users
wanting to know about the availability of a new mark before the
243
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due to the fact that Congress did not intend famous trademark owners to
sit by and watch the value of their trademarks slowly diminish before
allowing them a cause of action and a remedy. 249 Moreover, House
reports do not suggest that the injured trademark owners must show
actual harm.250 Rather, Congress seemed to assume that the FTDA
would provide action against diluting marks regardless of whether
actual harm could be shown since its intent was so clear.251 Furthermore,
the potential damages that can be awarded also support the likelihood of
252
dilution standard.
Since injunctive relief is only granted when willful intent can be
proven, it is clear that Congress intended to fashion a subset of cases
where the defendant's willful conduct justified a stiffer penalty. 253 By the
time actual economic harm could be proven, if it could be, injunctive
relief would be insufficient as a remedy. 254 An injunction would not
adequately compensate an owner or restore the value of its famous
mark.255 In addition, under the actual harm theory, some defendants

product is launched; "[i]f the statute is interpreted to mean that no
adjudication can be made until the junior mark has been launched and
has caused actual dilution, businesses in Nabisco's position will be
unable to seek declaratory relief before going to market."
The
appellate court affirmed the preliminary injunction, requiring Nabisco
to recall and cease selling its snack mix containing the goldfish
configuration.
Id. (second alteration in original); see also Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 224; Brief of Amicus Curiae
Intellectual Prop. Law Professors et al. at 10.
249
Brief of Amicus Curiae Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass'n et al. at 16.
250
See H.R. REP. No. 104-374 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029.
251
Id. This House Report provided that the use of "DUPONT shoes, BUICK aspirin, and
KODAK pianos would be actionable" under the FTDA. Id. at 3; Brief of Amicus Curiae
Intellectual Prop. Law Professors et al. at 11.
252
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2) (2000).
253
Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Prop. Law Professors et al. at 11:
The remedy for dilution under the FTDA is an injunction to prevent
dilution before it turns into actual harm ....
If proof of actual
economic harm is required before giving the FTDA effect, the Act
would serve merely to recognize, ex post facto, that a trademark owner
had been injured. The injunctive remedy is intended to curtail and
prevent loss to the owner of a famous mark without a showing of
economic harm. Balancing the absence of need to prove actual injury,
the statute denies the owner the right to seek damages unless proof of
willful dilution is shown.
Id.
254 Id.
255
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2); Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Prop. Law Professors et al. at
11.
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intend to cause dilution even though the injured party cannot show
actual evidence of this intent.2 6 The only proof necessary for injunctive
relief in the federal courts has been irreparable harm and inadequacy of
legal remedies, and not actual harm.257 Also, a likelihood of dilution
standard is consistent with trademark infringement actions because it
permits the court to draw conclusions of dilution based on
circumstantial evidence, rather than requiring direct evidence of actual
258
harm, which is generally not available.
Second, at the time the FTDA was enacted, no state anti-dilution
statute was interpreted as imposing the burden of proving actual
economic harm.259 Congress did nothing to specify that it was breaking
away from what all the other anti-dilution statutes had previously
indicated. 260 Because the FTDA was based on the state anti-dilution
statutes, one can assume that Congress intended to follow the concept of
261
dilution embodied in these statutes.

Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Prop. Law Professors et al. at 11. It would be an
odd reading of the statute for the basic remedy to cover less ground than the enhanced
remedy. Id. More likely, Congress assumed that when it enacted the FTDA that it
authorized the courts to enjoin conduct that was likely to dilute a famous mark. Id.
257 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2). The statute provides for an injunction and no damages,
unless willfulness can be shown. Id.; Brief of Amicus Curiae Am. Intellectual Prop. Law
Ass'n et al. at 10. Congress did not modify the standards of proof necessary to obtain an
injunction when it enacted the FTDA. Brief of Amicus Curiae Am. Intellectual Prop. Law
Ass'n et al. at 10. Therefore, Congress clearly decided not to alter the injunctive relief
standard and, thus, embraced the principle of equity for granting an injunction under the
FTDA. Id.; Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 215 (1962).
258 See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 224 n.5 (2d Cir. 1999); Brief of
Amicus Curiae Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass'n et al. at 8. "Indirect evidence of relevant
contextual factors is no different than the types of inferential proofs used in a likelihood of
dilution analysis. Even the Fourth Circuit concedes that 'relevant contextual factors ...are
of obvious relevance as indirect evidence' [of dilution]." Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 224 n.5.
256

259

RESTATEMENT

(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION

§ 25; Brief of Amicus Curiae

Intellectual Prop. Law Professors et al. at 11; Klieger, supra note 50, at 813-14. Congress
stated that a federal dilution statute was necessary because "famous marks ordinarily are
used on a nationwide basis and dilution protection is currently only available on a patchH.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1996
quilt system of protection."
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030. Thus, Congress worried that state statutes were inconsistent with
each other; however, the overwhelming majority of state statutes enacted at that time all
appeared to prevent conduct that was "likely to dilute" the senior user's mark. Brief of
Amicus Curiae Intellectual Prop. Law Professors et al. at 11.
260 Id. at 11-12; PATrISHALL, supra note 10, at 392 (stating that currently dilution statutes
exist in over half of the states and generally only require a likelihood of dilution).
261 Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Prop. Law Professors et al. at 11-12. "It is likely
that Congress assumed that it was enacting a statute that, like the state statutes on which it
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Third, in 1999, Congress amended the FTDA to make it clear that the
owner of a famous trademark could oppose the registration of another's
trademark on the grounds that it diluted the famous trademark. 262 The
1999 FTDA amendment is completely inconsistent with the actual harm
theory. 263 This amendment plainly allows a trademark owner to stop the
dilution of its trademark before it begins by opposing the registration of
264
a mark that may potentially dilute the owner's trademark.
Fourth, the FTDA should be read to imply a likelihood of dilution
standard because this would be consistent with the Trademark Trial and
Appeal Board's ("TTAB") interpretation of the FTDA. 265 The TTAB has
interpreted the FTDA to require a likelihood of dilution standard. 266 To
ensure certainty and uniformity in cases, the standard for proving

was modeled, prevented commercial uses of a mark likely to dilute its distinctive
significance." Id. at 12.
262 Trademark Amendments Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 10643, 113 Stat. 218. Specifically, 15
U.S.C. § 1052 was amended to read:
A mark which when used would cause dilution under section 1125(c)
of this title may be refused registration only pursuant to a proceeding
brought under section 1063 of this title. A registration for a mark
which when used would cause dilution under section 43(c) may be
canceled pursuant to a proceeding brought under either section 1064 of
this title or 1125(c) of this title or section 1092 of this title.
Trademark Amendments Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 10643, 113 Stat. 218; 15 U.S.C. § 1052
(2000).
263 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(f), 1063-64, 1092; Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Prop. Law
Professors et al. at 13.
264 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(f), 1063-64, 1092; Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Prop. Law
Professors et al. at 13. The amendment is flatly inconsistent with the actual dilution
standard. Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Prop. Law Professors et al. at 13. By allowing
the owners of famous marks to oppose registrations that would dilute the famous mark
even before the mark was used in commerce, Congress intended trademark owners to stop
possible dilution even before it began. Id. One can construe a statute to reach an outcome
that was not intended. Id. But, this is hard to do when congressional intent is as plain as it
is in the FTDA. Id. Congressional intent "counsels that the court look long and hard for
support for the 'likelihood of dilution' reading." Id.
26
15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(f), 1063-64, 1092; Brief of Amicus Curiae Am. Intellectual Prop. Law
Ass'n et al. at 18. Three years after passing the FTDA, Congress created the Trademark
Amendments Act of 1999 ("TAA"). 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(f), 1063-64, 1092. This allowed for
dilution claims to be heard before the TTAB of the United State Patent and Trademark
Office. Id. The TAA reads that an owner of a famous mark may assert dilution as a reason
to oppose a mark before it has been registered or as grounds to cancel a dilutive mark,
before it has suffered dilution damage in the commercial marketplace. Trademark
Amendment's Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 10643, 113 Stat. 218.
266 Toro Co. v. ToroHead, Inc., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d 1164, 1174 (2001) (stating that the actual
dilution standard would "defeat the articulated purpose of the TAA').
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267
dilution should be the same for both the TTAB and the federal courts.
In addition, the FTDA was enacted to bring the United States trademark
law into conformity with international treaties that do not require actual
268
economic harm as a showing for dilution.

Fifth, if the FTDA is read to impose a likelihood of dilution standard,
it will not render the FTDA too powerful as some critics allege.269 The
FTDA already has various built-in limitations. 270 Only famous marks are
protected under the FTDA, and the fame requirement is held to a strict
reading, which is reserved for only the most fanciful marks. 271 To
impose an actual harm standard in an effort to limit the reach of the
FTDA would incorrectly limit dilution.272 By applying the actual harm
theory, a detrimental ramification would be that it could prevent the
effective relief in cases of real dilution, when an injured party cannot
prove actual economic harm, and it would do absolutely nothing to
273
enhance the fame requirement or address other legitimate concerns.
Attaching the actual economic harm standard to the FTDA would
prevent the statute from being effective in cases where dilution truly is
likely.

274

Finally, the Supreme Court's holding that proof of actual dilution is
necessary to prove dilution was incorrect and overly narrow. 275 The

267 Brief of Amicus Curiae Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass'n et al. at 18-19.
268 Id. at 11. Congress sought to protect famous marks in order to "be consistent" with
the terms of International Treaties. Id.
269 Id. at 15. The Fourth Circuit adopted the actual dilution standard out of some
concerns that the likelihood of dilution theory would render the FTDA too powerful and
might be read to create a "property right in gross" which would preclude any uses of a
famous mark without permission. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc.
v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 454 (4th Cir. 1999).
270 15 U.S.C. § 1127; Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Prop. Law Professors, et al. at 15;
see supra note 130. These limits are in place to prevent dilution law from expanding beyond
its proper scope. Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Prop. Law Professors, et al. at 15.
271 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (c)(1); Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 1999).
272 Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Prop. Law Professors et al. at 16.
273

Id.

If the courts are to cabin abuses of the FTDA, they should do it by
limiting dilution protection to truly famous marks, by properly
interpreting the tarnishment requirement, and by insisting on proof of
commercial use of a mark. This Court should not adopt a reading of
the statute that prevents it from being applied where dilution truly is
likely. Doing so throws the baby out with the bath water.
Id.
274

Id.

275 Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue Inc., 123 S.Ct. 1115, 1124 (2003).
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Court's attempt to resolve the circuit split only resulted in more
confusion. The current position of the Supreme Court is completely
unworkable. The Court has stated that survey evidence is not necessary
to prove actual dilution, but the Court has not presented trademark
owners with an example of the viable means needed for a finding of
dilution. 276 If the Supreme Court's present position is correct, the vague
standard it has imposed and the lack of means to prove this standard
have rendered the FTDA completely meaningless. Therefore, due to
these reasons that support a likelihood of dilution standard rather than
an actual harm standard, Congress should amend the FTDA to reflect the
likelihood of dilution standard.
IV.

AMENDING THE FEDERAL TRADEMARK DILUTION

ACT: A PROPOSAL

Against a background of robust disagreement about the appropriate
test courts should apply when analyzing dilution claims, this Note
argues that the likelihood of dilution standard is the correct method and
proposes that Congress should amend the FTDA to reflect this.277 Part III
of this Note established that both the actual dilution and likelihood of
dilution methods have some faults. 278 This is due to the fact that, under
the actual harm standard, a quantifiable injury must be proven. Thus,
the senior user has already been harmed, the value of the trademark has
been diminished, and the standard is extremely difficult to prove. 279 In
addition, critics claim the likelihood of dilution method may be
potentially flawed because the FTDA does not explicitly state that this is
the correct standard, and the Supreme Court has held contrary to this
standard. 2 0 Also, this interpretation of the statute blurs the line between
infringement and dilution. 281 Considering all factors, there might not be
an easy answer regarding how to prove an ambiguous concept like
dilution. This Note demonstrates that the dilution theory has plagued

Id.; Robert Sacoff & Uli Widmaier, Trademark Case Leaves Open Questions: Court Adopts
Some of ABA's Analysis Despite Ruling Against Victoria's Secret, A.B.A. J. E-REP., Mar. 7, 2003,
at 3 (stating that an adoption of an open-ended approach, that is in the best common-law
tradition, encourages future courts to fashion evidentiary standards is appropriate under
the facts of specific cases).
277 See generally Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999) (arguing that a
likelihood of dilution is the correct standard); Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined
Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999) (arguing that actual
dilution is the correct standard).
278
See supra Part III.
279 See supra notes 230-31 and accompanying text.
280 See supra text accompanying notes 242-44.
281 See supra text accompanying note 245.
276
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the circuits for years and ultimately led to their split and a vague
Supreme Court decision. Therefore, it must be realized that there is no
mysterious calculation that will prove or disprove dilution. However,
the likelihood of dilution standard should be implemented into the
FTDA to clear up the vague language and, thus, prove to be a viable
solution.
In an attempt to address the recent circuit split and the ambiguity
that surrounds the dilution concept, the FTDA must be amended. 2 2 The
main problem with the FTDA is that the language in the statute is
ambiguous. 283 This problem should be rectified by amending the FTDA
24
to unambiguously reflect the likelihood of dilution standard. 8
Thus, section 1127 of the FTDA should be amended to include the
following two phrases: "likelihood of causing dilution" and "actual
proof of dilution." Section 1127 of the FTDA would then read as follows:
the term dilution means the likelihood of causing dilution
due to the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to
identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of
the presence or absence of (1) competition between the
owner of the famous mark and other parties, or (2)
likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception, or (3)
actual proofof dilu tion.285
In this way, the statute would require only a minimal showing of a
"likelihood of dilution." Moreover, with "actual proof of dilution" as the
third clause in the statute, the statute would expressly indicate that
actual proof of dilution is not solely required, contrary to the Supreme
Court's holding. Thus, the existence of actual dilution would become
immaterial because a senior trademark holder would never be required
to meet this higher standard of proof.

282 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
283 Id. Currently the FTDA reads, "the term dilution means the lessening of the capacity
of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence
or absence of (1) competition between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or
(2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception." Id. However, the Supreme Court has
recently stated that the FTDA is not vague and that the definition of dilution provides for
proof of actual dilution. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 427 (2003).
284 Id. Namely the addition of the phrase, "likelihood of causing dilution" will eliminate
some of the inherent ambiguity present in the FTDA and will render an obvious standard
for dilution. Id.
285 Id. The italicized sections are the proposed amendments to the current FTDA.
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The advantages of this modification are enormous. By adding the
additional language to the FTDA, ambiguity would be eliminated and
the statute would clearly state the correct level of proof for dilution. The
amendment would rectify the Supreme Court's incorrect decision and
28 6
would provide the correct national standard for all courts to apply.
Additionally, it would provide all federal courts with language that
specifically limits the interpretation of the FTDA, which would greatly
benefit courts, as well as senior and junior users. Courts would blatantly
know what standard to apply and senior and junior users would know
how to evaluate whether or not their mark may be diluted or if they are
about to dilute a mark through a junior use. The new reading of the
FTDA would put courts and senior and junior users on notice and give
fair warning to any possible diluters. 2 7 Furthermore, under the
amended FTDA, the senior user would not need to suffer unnecessary
harm before bringing a dilution claim. However, if the senior user could
point to proof of actual harm, the amended FTDA is flexible enough to
allow this evidence to be presented in the court, even though only the
lower, likelihood of dilution burden of proof would be necessary.
Also, the addition to the FTDA will bring the statute into
conformance with the state anti-dilution laws and the TrAB. Currently,
28
both state and TTAB laws maintain a likelihood of dilution standard.
Moreover, since the FTDA has safeguards embedded in it, like the
famous requirement, this new FTDA will not render the statute too
powerful, as some critics claim. 2 9 The fame requirement in the FTDA is
held to a very strict reading and is reserved for only the most fanciful
marks.290 Most importantly, the incorporation of the likelihood of
dilution standard will ensure that all legitimate dilution claims are
capable of being brought before a court and that none are excluded
because they cannot meet the extremely high burden of actual proof of
dilution.

See supra notes 275-76 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text. This amendment to the FTDA would
erase the vagueness of the statute, and the addition of the terms, "likelihood of dilution,"
will present a clear-cut standard for courts to determine if dilution may occur.
Additionally, from a realistic viewpoint, this amendment will also put all senior and junior
trademark users on notice. It will encourage senior users to police their marks for possible
dilution by allowing them an unambiguous method and will give junior users a clear
criterion to apply to assess whether or not they may dilute a senior user's trademark.
2M See supra notes 265-67 and accompanying text.
286

287

289

See supra note 270.

290

See supra note 271 and accompanying text.
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V. CONCLUSION

Trademark dilution is the gradual whittling away of the value of a
trademark resulting in the loss of good will and property from the senior
user. This Note examined the recent circuit split and a vague Supreme
Court opinion regarding the trademark dilution standard, as well as
detailed why the likelihood of dilution standard is the correct method to
apply and why the actual dilution theory is not. Given the two
approaches to trademark dilution and the recent Supreme Court opinion,
this Note recommends that the FTDA should be amended to read that a
likelihood of dilution is the correct standard to employ. This amendment
would eliminate the ambiguous nature of the FTDA as it currently reads,
and it would further eradicate the consternation that has left many
trademark owners dumbfounded. The likelihood of dilution standard
would be highly beneficial if incorporated into the FTDA; thus, an
amendment to the FTDA is in order.
Relating back to the hypothetical in Part I, under the amended
FTDA, Tom would only need to show a likelihood of dilution to hold
Anna liable. Under this theory, Tom's trademark will not have its
distinctiveness whittled away and he will not incur injury. Moreover,
the FTDA will be exonerated of its inherent vagueness and, thus, the
FTDA will prove to be a clear and useful tool for senior and junior users
such as Tom and Anna.
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